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In response to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. on
September 11, 2001 the United States has waged a global war on terrorism
Since September 11, 2001, the United States Federal Government has built up an
arsenal of executive and legislative weapons to fight this war on terrorism. As
part of that arsenal, President George W. Bush issued a Military Order on
November 13, 2001 that established military commissions to try suspected
terrorists. Some critics have denounced the Order as an unconstitutional
deprivation of civil liberties that far exceeds President Bush's power as
Commander-in-Chief. Others have argued that in times of war the government
may constitutionally deprive civil liberties in order to protect the country, and
that President Bush acted within his war powers when issuing the Order.
This note seeks to answer two basic questions. First, are President Bush's
Military Order and the rules promulgated under that Order constitutional even if
they deprive civil liberties? Second, even if the Order and its rules are
constitutional, will President Bush's military commissions help win the war
against terrorism? President Bush's military tribunals are likely constitutional in
light of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding both the military commissions
established by President Lincoln during the Civil War and President Roosevelt
during World War II. As written, however, both the November 13 Order and the
Department of Defense rules promulgated under it violate international law,
namely the Geneva Conventions. This note suggests that President Bush's
military commissions will hinder, rather than facilitate, the war on terrorism
until the Bush Administration amends the Order and the rules promulgated
under it to adhere to international law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. on
September 11, 2001, the United States has waged a war on terrorism.1 President
George W. Bush has promised that "[w]e will defend our country and while we
do so, we will not sacrifice the freedoms that make our land unique." 2 Within
months of the attacks, however, critics-including law professors, attorneys,
members of Congress, and defenders of civil liberty-had already begun to argue
that President Bush was not keeping his promise.3 The main focus of criticism
has been President Bush's November 13 Military Order (November 13 Order),4
1 Elisabeth Bumiller & Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush Defends Wartime Call for Tribunals,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 5,2001, at Al; William Glaberson, Support for Bush's Antiterror Plan, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 5, 2001, at B6.
Under international law, the laws of war apply equally to declared wars and to armed
conflicts. Comm. on Military Affairs & Justice of the Ass'n of the B. of the City of N.Y., Inter
Arma Silent Leges: In Times of Armed Conflict, Should the Laws Be Silent?, 57 REC. ASS'N B.
CrrY N.Y. 39 (2002), www.abcny.org/pdf/should%20the%2OLaws%20be%2OSilent%204.pdf.,
at *11. [hereinafter Committee on Military Affairs]; see also infra notes 141-45 and
accompanying text. Congress authorized President Bush to use whatever military force he
deemed necessary to bring to justice the terrorists connected to the attacks of September 11.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
[hereinafter Joint Resolution]. President Bush acted on that authorization and initiated armed
conflict in Afghanistan shortly thereafter. Committee on Military Affairs, supra, at 3-4.
The United States has determined that the eighteen foreign nationals who carried out the
September 11 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were members
of the international terrorist organization al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden and based primarily
in Afghanistan. Id The United States Government accused al Qaeda of training, financing, and
controlling the September 11 attacks. d
2 President George W. Bush, Remarks at Swearing-In Ceremony of Former Pennsylvania
Governor Tom Ridge as director of the Office of Homeland Security (Oct. 8, 2001).
3 See William Safire, Kangaroo Courts, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 26, 2001, at A17; Evan
Thomas & Michael Isikoff, Between Liberty and Security, NEWswEEK, Dec. 10, 2001, at 36;
see, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Wake Up, America, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27 (noting the
dangerous breadth of the November 13 Order, infra note 4, the lack of sunset provision, and the
dangerous precedent of tyranny).
4 Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
November 13 Order]. A military order invokes the president's power as commander-in-chief,
while an executive order evokes a president's power as the chief executive officer of the United
States. Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 6 n.18. Of course, there are also law
professors, attorneys, congresspersons, and members of the general public who support
President Bush's November 13 Order as just. See, e.g., Professor Barry Latzer, Letter to the
Editor, If bin Laden Is Brought to Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at A26; DOJ Oversight:
Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch, Ranking Republican
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which asserts President Bush's authority5 to establish military commissions6 to
try suspected terrorists.7
Some critics have declared the proclamation an unconstitutional deprivation
of fundamental liberties that far exceeds the executive's power as Commander-in-
Chief.8 Other critics have suggested that although the proclamation may be
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (Dec. 6, 2001), http://judiciary.senate.gov/
prinLmemberstatementcfm?id=121&wit id=51 (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
5 No actual military commissions have been established under the November 13 Order.
The closest that the Bush Administration has come to establishing an actual commission since
November 13 was in late November when the Administration debated whether to try Zacarias
Moussaoui, a French citizen of Moroccan descent, under a military commission or in federal
court. Don Van Natta Jr., Debate Centers on Which Court Will Decide Fate ofArab Man, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at B6. Moussaoui was arrested on immigration charges after he sought
lessons from a flight school on how to fly, but not land, jets. Id. The Administration chose,
however, to try Moussaoui in federal district court. Don Van Natta Jr., Compromise Settles
Debate Over Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,2001, at BI.
6 The phrase "military commission" usually refers to a common law war court set up
during periods of hostilities, martial rule, or military government as a tool for the more efficient
execution of the war powers vested in Congress and the President. See Lt. Col. Thomas C.
Marmoa et al., Military Commissions 3 (April 1953) (unpublished manual, on file with The
Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Va.); CHARLES FAIMAN, THE LAW OF
MARTIAL RuLE 262 (2d ed. 1943). Military commissions are special courts in that they provide
for the exercise of extraordinary war powers. Marmoa et al., supra, at 14 n.33.
The phrase "military tribunal," on the other hand, refers to all courts of military justice,
including courts-martial and military commissions. Marmoa et al., supra, at 13. Military
tribunals can basically try three types of cases. First, military tribunals can try members of the
military for violation of the military code. Id. at 14. Generally, this first type of case is tried in
courts-martial. Id Second, military tribunals can try civilians for civil crimes when civil courts
are closed. Id Third, military tribunals can try civilians and members of the military who have
violated the laws of war. Id. The second and third types of cases are usually tried in military
commissions. Id
Under the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946
(2000), general courts-martial have jurisdiction to try all three types of cases cognizable by
military tribunals. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2000). The UCMJ also provides that § 818's granting of
jurisdiction to courts-martial does not deprive military commissions of concurrent jurisdiction
for offenses or offenders that military commissions may try under the laws of war or the
authority of a statute. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
7 See, e.g., supra note 3. The November 13 Order would apply to all non-citizens
determined by the President to fit into at least one of three groups: (1) members of the
international organization known as al Qaeda; (2) to have engaged in, aided, abetted, or
conspired to commit either acts of international terrorism or acts in preparation for acts of
international terrorism that have caused, threaten to cause, or aim to cause injury or adverse
affects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or (3)
those who have intentionally harbored persons covered under (1) and (2). November 13 Order,
supra note 4, § 2, at 57,834.
8 For example, Laurence Tribe, professor of constitutional law at Harvard Law School
and witness before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the constitutionality of the November 13
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constitutional, it is nevertheless unwise to infringe on the Constitution during this
war against terrorism--a war meant to avenge the very same liberties that the
November 13 Order seems to infringe.9 This note, inspired by the countless
editorials, articles, interviews, Internet discussions, and law school classroom
conversations about the November 13 Order, seeks to evaluate the
constitutionality and the wisdom of President Bush's proposed military
commissions. Parts I1 and 111 review the context and make-up of the military
commissions that President Lincoln established during the Civil War and that
President Roosevelt established during World War II. The evaluation in Part IV
compares Bush's war commission with those historic commissions. The note then
concludes in Part V with a look to one aspect of international law, the Geneva
Conventions, to answer the question: What efficacy will President Bush's war
commission have on the global war against terrorism?10
11. CIVIL WAR MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND SUSPENSION OF HABEAS
CORPUS
A. Lincoln Establishes Martial Law and Suspends Habeas Corpus
On April 27, 1861, President Lincoln simultaneously declared martial law
and authorized Commanding General Winfield Scott to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus I in Union territories where civilian war protesters were
Order, stated, "I denounced [the] order as unconstitutional. The power that it asserts is too
quintessentially legislative to stand without authorization from Congress, which the laws cited
by the [Aittomey [G]eneral fail to provide." Laurence H. Tribe, Letter to the Editor, Military
Tribunals: Too Broad a Power, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 2001, at A30; see also DOJ Oversight:
Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School) (Dec. 4, 2001), http:llwww.senate.gov/-judiciarytestimony.cfm?id=129&witid=73
(last visited Oct. 12, 2002); DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (statement of Kate
Martin, Director of the Center for National Security Studies) (Nov. 28, 2001),
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/testimony.cfm?id=126&witid=71 (last visited Oct. 21,
2002).
9 See, e.g., William Glaberson, Use of Military Court Divides Legal Experts, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2001, at B8.
10 The international legal principles governing the legality of the military commissions are
not limited to the Geneva Conventions. Unfortunately, a survey of international law regarding
military commissions is beyond the scope of this paper.
11 PAUL BREST Er AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECIsION MAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 222 (4th ed. 2000). Lincoln's proclamation of April 27, 1861, addressed to
Winfield Scott, Commanding General of United States Army:
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at
any point on or in the vicinity of the military line which is now used between the city of
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compromising the war effort by encouraging defectors and recruiting for the
confederate army.' 2 Lincoln proclaimed that all persons who discouraged
enlistments or engaged in disloyal practices would be subject to trial in a military
commission, regardless of whether they were civilians or military.' 3 Lincoln
thought military commissions 14 were necessary because, according to him, state
courts did not have the authority to convict war protesters. 15 By suspending the
privilege of habeas corpus, Lincoln denied persons tried under military
commissions the right to remove their cases to civil courts, including the Supreme
Court. 16
Writing for the Court, Justice Taney ruled in Ex parte Merryman'7 that the
President's suspension of habeas corpus was unconstitutional on two grounds: (1)
Philadelphia via Penryville, Annapolis City and Annapolis Junction [Maryland] you find
resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public
safety, you personally or through the officer in command at the point where resistance
occurs are authorized to suspend that writ.
Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, to Winfield Scott, Commanding
General of the United States Army (April 27, 1861), http://www.civilwarhome.com/Writ.htm
(last visited Oct. 21, 2002). That same day General Scott forwarded the President's
communication to the area generals. BREST E" AL., supra, at 222.
12 BREST Er AL, supra note 11, at 222.
13 Id. The Union used military commissions to try approximately 2,000 cases during the
Civil War. Marmoa et al., supra note 6, at 6.
14 The Civil War was the frst time in American history that the term "military
commissions" was widely used to designate American common law war courts. Marmoa et al.,
supra note 6, at 5-6.
15 See BREST Er AL, supra note 11, at 222.
16 Id. Generally, "Habeas Corpus" is a "writ employed to bring a person before a court."
BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 284 (Pocket ed. 1996). There are several forms of the writ of
habeas corpus. Id The writ may be used in civil cases to remove the case from an inferior court
to a superior court, or to remove a person from one court's custody to another court's custody.
l (respectively, "habeas corpus ad faciendum et recipiendum" and "habeas corpus ad
respondendum"). The writ may also be used in criminal cases to bring a prisoner before the
court on charges other than those for which the prisoner is confined. Id. (referring to "habeas
corpus ad prosequendum"). The writ may be used in civil or criminal cases to bring a prisoner
to a court to testify. l (referring to "habeas corpus ad testificandum"). The most frequent
reason the writ is employed, and the most important form of the writ for this note, is to direct a
person or institution that is detaining a person to bring that person before a court in order to
ensure that the party's imprisonment is not illegal. Id. (referring to "habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum").
17 Exparte Menyman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). Maryland Secessionist
John Merryman was among the thousands arrested by military troops under Lincoln's
declaration. Id at 144-45. Military troops arrested Menyman on May 25, 1861, for destroying
railroad bridges after an antiwar riot in Baltimore. Il Menyman's lawyer fied a writ of habeas
corpus addressed to General George Cadwalader, commander of Fort McHenry where
Menyman was being held. Id. at 145. Honorable Roger B. Taney, then Chief Justice of the
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only Congress has the right to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus; and (2) the
President exceeded his war powers.18 First, Justice Taney rejected the proposition
that in times of war the President must have the authority to do whatever is
necessary to protect the country. 19 He asserted that because "[t]he government of
the United States is one of delegated and limited power," the branches of the
government could not exercise power beyond those expressly granted under the
Constitution, even in times of war.20 The Constitution does not expressly state
who has the authority to suspend habeas corpus when public safety so requires.21
Taney asserted, however, that because the constitutional provision authorizing
suspension of habeas corpus is located in Article I, the article devoted to the
legislative department, only an Act of Congress could authorize the suspension.22
Second, Justice Taney stated that unless a person was under the military's
judicial authority and subject to military control, a military officer had no right to
arrest and detain a person not subject to the rules and articles of war for an offense
against the laws of the United States.23 If a military officer arrested a party not
subject to the military's judicial authority, Taney asserted, the officer had the duty
to deliver that person to the civil authority immediately. 24 Taney found that
Supreme Court of the United States, issued the writ of habeas corpus commanding the military
to bring Merryman before the circuit court in Baltimore where Justice Taney was serving at the
time. BREST Er AL., supra note 11, at 223. General Cadwalader refused to release Merryman or
to attend the May 27 hearing before Taney. Id General Cadwalader also refused to comply
with a second order from Taney to be present the following day, May 28. Id. General
Cadwalader justified detaining Merryman on the basis of President Lincoln's suspension of
habeas corpus. DONALD P. KOMMERS & JOHN E. FINN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw:
ESSAYS, CASES, AND COMPARATIVE NoTEs 291 (1988).
18 Id at 291.
19 Id The Justice specifically stated, "[n]or can any argument be drawn from the nature of
sovereignty, or the necessity of government, for self-defense in times of tumult and danger."
BREST ET AL., supra note 11, at 225.
20 KoMMERS & FINN, supra note 17, at 291.
21 BREST Er AL., supra note 11, at 223. Article I, section 9, clause 2 of the U.S.
Constitution states in full: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Although the "Privilege of Habeas Corpus" is a constitutionally required due
process protection, the fact that it is a "Privilege" rather than a "right" indicates that the
privilege may be revoked. Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 2. The Constitution
states that the privilege may only be suspended in time of crisis, i.e., "Rebellion or Invasion,"
when the public safety requires. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The Framers wrote the clause in a
passive form-"shall not be suspended"---rather than active. Id. The Constitution does not
expressly state, however, what person or branch of the government has the authority to decide
that public safety requires a suspension of the privilege.
22 BREST ET AL, supra note 11, at 222-23.
23 Id at 223.
24 Id
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because Menyman was a civilian from Indiana, a state not at war with the United
States, and because the civilian courts in Indiana were open, the military did not
have judicial authority over Merryman.25 Although Lincoln released Merryman,
he ignored Justice Taney's clear position and continued to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and to try civilians in military courts. 26
B. Lincoln Defends His Actions to Congress and Congress Responds
During a special address to Congress on July 4, 1861, President Lincoln
acknowledged that as executive he did not generally have the authority to suspend
habeas corpus.27 Lincoln in fact expressly requested that Congress sanction his
actions.28 Lincoln nevertheless defended his establishment of military courts and
his suspending habeas corpus.29 He claimed that because Congress had not been
in session when the need to suspend habeas corpus arose, as President and
Commander-in-Chief he was forced to act on his own to protect the nation:
[T]he Constitution itself, [sic] is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the
power [to suspend habeas corpus]; and as the provision was plainly made for a
dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument
intended, that in every case, the danger should run its course, until Congress
could be called together .... 30
25 Id at 225.
26 KOMMERS & FINN, supra note 17, at 291; see also BREST ET AL, supra note 11, at 224.
Taney wrote, "[the president] certainly does not faithfully execute the laws, if he takes upon
himself legislative power, by suspending the writ of habeas corpus, and the judicial power also,
by arresting and imprisoning a person without due process of law." Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.
Cas. 144, 149 (D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
27 LouLs FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 38 (1995).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 KOMMERS & FNN, supra note 17, at 291 (quoting President Lincoln). Lincoln also
stated:
I [understood] my oath to preserve the [C]onstitution to the best of my ability, imposed
upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government-that
nation-of which that [C]onstitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the
nation, and yet preserve the [C]onstitution? I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional,
might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the [Clonstitution,
through the preservation of the nation.
Id. at 287.
President Lincoln was also confident that Congress would agree that he had done what
was necessary, stating: "[Wlhether strictly legal or not, [my actions] were ventured upon under
what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that
Congress would readily ratify them." FISHER, supra note 27, at 38.
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Congress apparently took to heart the President's request to ratify his actions.
On August 6, 1861, Congress retroactively approved "all the acts, proclamations,
and orders of the President... respecting the army and navy of the United
States." 31 On March 3, 1863, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act that
provided President Lincoln the power to suspend habeas corpus whenever he
determined public safety required suspension.32 President Lincoln cited the
March 3 statutory authority when, on September 15, 1863, he again proclaimed
that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended.33
C. The Supreme Court Responds
The Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality of Lincoln's military
commissions and his suspending habeas corpus until Ex pare Milligan,34 decided
a year after the war had ended and Lincoln had died.35 The Court established that,
despite Congress's ratification of Lincoln's military order suspending habeas
corpus, the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear a writ of habeas corpus to
determine the validity of the military commission's jurisdiction.36 Consequently,
the Supreme Court could review whether a military commission had jurisdiction
over Milligan.37
31 BREST Er AL., supra note 11, at 225. Scholars assert there is uncertainty as to whether
this August 6 Act included the suspension of habeas corpus, although there seems to be no
doubt that it included the declaration of martial law. Id.
32 Id at 225. The Act stated in pertinent part, "during the present rebellion the President of
the United States, whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require it, is authorized to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States or
any part thereof." Id Although Congress did not expressly chastise Lincoln for stepping outside
his constitutional authority, some scholars argue that the March 3 Act implied either that the
president does not have the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, or that the president
only has authority when Congress is not in session and public safety requires. l
33 Id
34 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Justice Davis, writing for the majority, seemed to imply that
during war time considerations of public safety require actions that would not be prudent in
times of safety:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not allow that calmness in
deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial
question. Then, considerations of safety were mingled with the exercise of power; and
feelings and interests prevailed which are happily terminated. Now that the public safety is
assured, this question, as well as all others, can be discussed and decided without passion
or the admixture of any element not required to form a legal judgment.
d. at 109.
35 FISHER, supra note 27, at 40.
36 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 130-31.
37 Id at 110.
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The Court also recognized that in emergency times, the government needed
the ability to detain persons who posed immediate danger to the country.38
Nevertheless, the Court agreed with Justice Taney's holding in Merryman39 that
national emergency and war could not sanction a military trial of a civilian if the
federal civil courts were open to hear criminal accusations.40 Additionally,
although Congress gave the President, in the 1863 Act, the authority to suspend
habeas corpus when public safety required, that Act also expressly stated that, as
long as civil courts were open, the military was required to cede jurisdiction over
civilians whom it had arrested to the civil courts.41 The Court felt that the law
would only justify a military trial of a civilian if the civil courts were closed.42
Therefore the President, even though the country was at war, "had no right to
38 Id at 125.
39 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
40 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121; KOMMERS & FINN, supra note 17, at 292; FISHER,
supra note 27, at 40.
According to the Milligan Court, Congress's 1863 Act relating to habeas corpus did not
permit the military to detain a suspected person beyond a fixed period, unless judicial
proceedings commenced against him in civil courts. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 116. The
military was to provide the judges of the courts of the United States a list of names of all
persons, not prisoners of war, who were then or would be held in custody by the authority of the
President, and who were citizens of states where the federal courts were open and unimpaired.
l If a grand jury of the district convened and adjourned and did not indict or present one of the
persons listed, that person was entitled to discharge. Id If the military refused to provide the
judges with a list and twenty days passed from the time of arrest to the end of the session of the
grand jury, that person was equally entitled to discharge as if the list had been provided. Id
Chief Justice Chase and three other members of the Court dissented because they believed
that if national security so required, Congress could submit citizens to the jurisdiction of
military trial even when civil courts were not closed:
[When the nation is involved in war, and some portions of the country are invaded, and all
are exposed to invasion, it is within the power of Congress to determine in what states or
districts such great and imminent public danger exists as justifies the authorization of
military tribunals for the trial of cries and offences against the discipline or security of the
army or against the public safety.
Id at 140. The dissenters therefore felt citizens could be subject to military trials, but only under
the authority of Congress, not the President acting alone. Id
41 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 131.
42 Id at 119. According to the Court, several Amendments to the Constitution-
specifically, the Fourth (right to be secure in one's person and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures); Fifth (right to a grand jury when held for capital or otherwise infamous
crime not arising in the land or naval forces when in actual service in time of war or public
danger, and the right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law);
and the Sixth (right to trial by jury--gave citizens the rights to trial in courts where those rights
are guaranteed. Id at 119-20. The Court did note that "[i]f there was law to justify this military
trial, it is not our province to interfere; if there was not, it is our duty to declare the nullity of the
whole proceedings." Id at 119.
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conclude that Milligan, if guilty, would not receive in [Circuit Court] merited
punishment .... " The Court also contradicted Lincoln's belief that civil courts
did not have the authority to convict war protesters. The Court stated that the
circuit court "constantly engaged in the trial of similar offense, and was never
interrupted in its administration of criminal justice."43 Additionally, the Supreme
Court noted that times of war are times when the Court is most compelled to
protect constitutional civil liberties.44
D. Important Points to Remember from the Milligan Decision
There are three elements of the Milligan case that are important in analyzing
President Bush's November 13 Order. First, the Milligan Court focused on the
fact that Congress's March 3, 1863, Habeas Corpus Act expressly stated that any
civilian citizens that the military arrested were to be handed over to the civil
courts, so long as the civil courts were in session.45
Second, the Court noted that even if Congress had authorized the President to
suspend habeas corpus, the federal courts would always enjoy the right to review
the jurisdiction of the military commissions.46
Third, the Milligan Court only addressed one of the three types of cases that a
military commission may hear: a case in which a civilian committed a civil
crime.47 Note that the Court was focusing on the distinction between members of
the military versus civilians, not on the distinction between citizens and aliens.
43 Id. at 122.
44 Id at 123-24. The Court stated:
When peace prevails, and the authority of the government is undisputed, there is no
difficulty of preserving the safeguards of liberty; for the ordinary modes of trial are never
neglected, and no one wishes it otherwise; but if society is disturbed by civil commotion-
if the passions of men are aroused and the restraints of law weakened, if not disregarded-
these safeguards need, and should receive, the watchful care of those intrusted [sic] with
the guardianship of the Constitution and laws. In no other way can we transmit to posterity
unimpaired the blessings of liberty, consecrated by the sacrifices of the Revolution.
Id
Congress seemed to disagree with the Milligan Court's holding. Congress responded to the
Court's holding in Milligan by passing legislation to limit the Court's jurisdiction to hear cases
involving Lincoln's military trials or martial law during the Civil War. FIsHER, supra note 27, at
40 (citation omitted). Civil courts could no longer take jurisdiction over or reverse decisions on
officer's acts to implement presidential proclamations from March 4, 1861, through June 30,
1866. Id
45 See supra note 40.
46 See supra note 36.
47 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121-22.
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Even though Milligan was a citizen, the Court indicated that its decision applies
not only to civilians, but also to all citizens.48
Ill. WORLD WAR 11: ROOSEVELT'S MIL1TARY COMvISSION
A. Roosevelt Creates a Military Commission to Try Nazi Saboteurs
Japan launched a devastating air-attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on
December 7, 1941. That attack killed thousands of American military men and
women and destroyed a large portion of the American naval fleet at a time when
the world was at war.49 Yet President Roosevelt did not establish a military
commission until eight members of the Nazi military landed on American soil,
changed into civilian clothes, and set out in secret to destroy American military
factories in the summer of 1942.50 On July 2, 1942, President Roosevelt issued a
48 The Court stated that "[t]he Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times, and under all circumstances." Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120-21. This
statement seems especially telling because the members of the 1866 Supreme Court had
recently witnessed the freeing of the slaves.
49 Kenneth Reich & David Pierson, Survivors of Pearl Harbor Honored, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2001, at B6. Some commentators have noted that the terrorist attacks of September 11
actually posed a much greater threat to the United States than the attack on Pearl Harbor. See,
e.g., Theo Stein, Terror Attacks Go Far Beyond Pearl Harbor, Historian Says, DENVER POST,
Sept. 23, 2001, at A30. Under such a view, it would not seem odd that President Bush called for
a military commission much sooner than President Roosevelt.
50 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942). The eight men had all spent significant time in
the United States but returned to Germany to join the German Reich between 1933 and 1941.
lt at 20. The men trained at a sabotage school near Berlin in preparation for their attack on
America. Id at 21. The first four saboteurs landed on Long Island about June 13, 1942, loaded
with explosives. Id The second group of four landed at Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida about June
17, 1942, also loaded with explosives. Id. All eight men were arrested in late June. It
Roosevelt did not establish a military commission until six months after Congress had
declared the United States at war. On December 8, 1941, the day after the Japanese bombed
Pearl Harbor, Congress declared war against Japan, S.J. Res. 116,77th Cong., Pub. L. No. 328,
55 Stat. 795 (1941). Just a few days later on December 11, 1941, Congress issued a declaration
of war against Germany and Italy. S.J. Res. 119, 77th Cong., Pub. L. No. 331, 55 Stat. 796
(1941); S.J. Res. 120, 77th Cong., Pub. L. No. 332, 55 Stat. 797 (1941). President Roosevelt
had in fact declared a national emergency three years before he felt the need for military
commissions: he declared a national emergency in 1939, and then again in 1941. Proclamation
No. 2352, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 114 (1968), reprinted in, 54 Stat. 2643 (1939)
(limited national emergency); Proclamation No. 2487, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 234
(1968), reprinted in, 55 Stat. 1647 (1941) (unlimited national emergency),
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/proclamations/frproc0l.htm. There is evidence,
however, that President Roosevelt did not establish a military commission because he thought
national security required it, or because the civilian courts could not handle the trial of the eight
Nazi saboteurs, but in order to cover a Federal Bureau of Investigation error in ignoring a tip
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proclamation that denied enemies access to the courts of the United States and
bestowed jurisdiction on military commissions over enemy trial.51 The same day,
the President issued an executive order creating a military commission and
directing that the Commission try the eight captured saboteurs "as soon ... as is
practicable. '52 President Roosevelt created the Commission without expressly
consulting Congress.53 Nevertheless, he grounded his authority to create the
Commission on "statutes of the United States," in addition to the Constitution and
his position as Commander-in-Chief.54
from one of the saboteurs. Safire, supra note 3. After President Roosevelt's death, President
Trunman established another World War II military commission to try the Far East Command.
See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
51 Proclamation No. 2561: Denying Certain Enemies Access to the Courts of the United
States, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 309 (1968), reprinted in, 56 Stat. 1964 (1942).
52 Military Order of July 2, 1942: Appointment of a Military Commission, 3 C.F.R.
(1938-1943 Compilation) 1308 (1968).
53 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28-29.
54 Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 309; Military Order of July
2, 1947, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 1308. After Roosevelt declared a national state of
emergency on May 27, 1941, the "Attorney General Frank Murphy collected a list of statutes
that became active on proclamation of a state of emergency or of war" even if the United States
remained neutral. FIsIER, supra note 27, at 69.
President Roosevelt recognized that his war powers as Commander-in-Chief were limited.
He felt that as executive he was authorized to take any action necessary to protect the United
States, unless the Constitution or the laws of the United States expressly prohibited that action.
KoMMERs & FINN, supra note 17, at 287. In fact, President Theodore Roosevelt had expressed
this view years before World War II started:
I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the Nation
could not be done by the President unless he could find some specific authorization to do
it. My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of
the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or the laws.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AutIBIOGRAPHY 357 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1920).
President Roosevelt exercised his authority as Commander-in-Chief to its fullest when he
authorized, without consulting Congress, the internment of thousands of people of Japanese
ancestry without trial after the attack on Pearl Harbor. See Exec. Order No. 9066: Authorizing
the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 1092
(1968). The Court upheld the President's Order, stating that "we cannot reject as unfounded the
judgment of the military authorities and of Congress" that internment was necessary to protect
the United States. KOMMERS & FINN, supra note 17, at 292. Justices Murphy and Jackson in
their dissents insisted that even in times of war, military discretion must have limits and that
internment based on race was going too far. Id. President Bush has also authorized the detaining
of legal aliens for questioning. November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 3(a), at 57,834. There is no
limit to the length of detention, and there is no sunset provision in the November 13 Order
itself. See id
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Persons in the military, civilians, citizens, and non-citizens were all subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission. 55 Any person who (1) entered or attempted to
enter the United States during a time of war and (2) was charged with
committing, attempting, or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or
warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, was subject to jurisdiction of the
Commission.56 The Commission would hear cases based on the law of war.57
Persons who were subject to the Commission were excluded from any of the
courts of the United States.58 The Proclamation gave the Attorney General the
authority to create regulations,59 and the military order gave the commission the
right to make its own procedural rules.6
55 Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 309. The Proclamation
included "[a]ll persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the
United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such nation." Id
Citizens and civilians as well as military officers could have fit this description.
56 lad The Proclamation stated that any persons:
who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States or any territory or
possession thereof, through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with
committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike
acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the
jurisdiction of the military tribunals.
Id
57 See supra note 55-56.
58 Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 309. The Proclamation
stated that "such persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding
directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf, in the courts
of the United States, or of its States, territories, and possessions." Id
59 10 U.S.C. § 1554 (1946) (repealed 1950); Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. (1938-
1943 Compilation) 309. (stating that "except under such regulations as the Attorney General,
with the approval of the Secretary of War, may from time to time prescribe"). It is unclear
whether the word "except" that introduces the Attorney General's right to prescribe regulations
allows the Attorney General simply to add to the President's proclamation or to alter the
proclamation.
60 Military Order of July 2, 1942: Appointment of a Military Commission, 3 C.F.R.
(1938-1943 Compilation) 1308 (1968). Roosevelt's Order expressly noted that the Articles of
War, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593a (1946) (§ 1522 repealed 1948; §§ 1471-1521, 1523-1578,
1581-1583, 1586-1590, 1593 repealed 1950; §§ 1579, 1580, 1584, 1585, 1591, 1592
transferred; § 1593a omitted as executed), gave military commissions the authority to make
procedural rules. Military Order of July 2, 1942, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 1308.
Although the Articles of War established procedural rules for military trials, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 1488-1508 (1946) (repealed 1950), the Articles of War also gave the President the authority
to make procedural rules for military commissions. 10 U.S.C. § 1509 (1946) (repealed 1950).
Roosevelt's Order required that all evidence of a probative value, as determined by the
president of the Commission, be admissible. Military Order of July 2, 1942, 3 C.F.R. (1938-
1943 Compilation) 1308. Conviction and sentence required a two-thirds vote of the members of
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B. Supreme Court Approves Commission Jurisdiction over Saboteurs
Shortly after the government appointed lawyers to the eight Nazi saboteurs,
those lawyers filed a writ of habeas corpus in the federal court for the District of
Columbia, challenging the jurisdiction of the military commission over the
saboteurs.61 The Supreme Court convened a special summer session to hear Ex
parte Quirin,62 the appeal of the district court's denial of the Nazis' habeas corpus
applications.63
The Quirin Court addressed two central issues. The first was whether the
Court had the power to hear the appeal of the habeas corpus petition, despite that
the Presidential Proclamation denied the Nazis the right to the writ of habeas
corpus.64 The second issue was whether President Roosevelt had the authority to
submit the Nazi defendants to trial by military commission.65
the Commission present. Id. The record on the trial, including any judgment or sentence, was to
be delivered to President Roosevelt for his action. Id
The White House released the following statement on August 8, 1942, after the trial and
executions were complete:
The President completed his review of the findings and sentences of the Military
Commission appointed by him on July 2, [11942, which tried eight Nazi saboteurs.
The President approved the judgment of the Military Commission that all of the
prisoners were guilty and that they be given the death sentence by electrocution.
However, there was a unanimous recommendation by the Commission, concurred in
by the Attorney General and the Judge Advocate General of the Army, that the sentence of
two of the prisoners be commuted to life imprisonment because of their assistance to the
Government of the United States in the apprehension and conviction of the others.
The commutation by the President in the case of Burger was to confinement at hard
labor for life. In the case of Dasch, the sentence was commuted by the President to
confinement at hard labor for thirty years.
The electrocutions began at noon today. Six of the prisoners were electrocuted. The
other two were confined to prison.
The records in all eight cases will be sealed until the end of the war.
Statement from the White House on the Sentences of Eight Nazi Saboteurs Landed by
Submarine on the Long Island and Florida Shores on June 13 and 17, 1942 (Aug. 8, 1942),
http://www.ibiblio.orglpha/policy/1942/420808a.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002). That
statement was the only information the Roosevelt Administration disclosed to the public
regarding the trial of the saboteurs. Notice that the executive branch disclosed no information
about the commission until after the saboteurs, whom the commission sentenced to death, were
executed. See id.
61 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1942).
62 Id
63 Id. at 18-19. The Court met on Wednesday, July 29, 1942, pursuant to Chief Justice
Stone's order. Id. All of the Associate Justices agreed to convene the special session. Id.
64 d. at 18-19, 23.
65 A majority of the Court could not agree on whether the President was permitted to
establish a procedure for the commission that conflicted with the procedure laid out in the
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First, the Court concluded that the petitioners could properly seek the
assistance of the federal courts, despite that President Roosevelt's Proclamation of
July 2, 1942, seemed to deny the eight Nazi saboteurs access to the federal
courts. 66 The Court recognized the exigencies of war, stating that the President's
orders "as Commander-in-Chief... in time of war and of grave public danger-
are not to be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they are in
conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted."6 7
The Court held that the President could never deny federal courts the right to hear
habeas corpus petitions to decide whether a military commission had jurisdiction
over a particular defendant.68
Second, the Court found that Congress gave the President the authority to
establish military commissions and that the President acted within the confines of
that authority.69 According to the Court, Congress had the power to define and
Articles of War for military tribunals. Id. at 47. Petitioners listed the following Articles of War
as conflicting with President Roosevelt's procedure for the Military Commission: Article of
War 38, 10 U.S.C. § 1509 (1946) (repealed 1950) (explaining that the President may prescribe
rules); Article of War 43, 10 U.S.C. § 1514 (1946) (repealed 1950) (articulating when the death
sentence is lawful); Article of War 46, 10 U.S.C. § 1517 (1946) (repealed 1950) (articulating
what action the convening authority may take); Article of War 50.5, 10 U.S.C. § 1522 (1946)
(repealed 1948) (explaining how the hearings would be reviewed); and Article of War 70, 10
U.S.C. § 1542 (1946) (repealed 1950) (explaining charges and how the tribunal could act on
charges).
Nevertheless, the Court stated it did not need to agree on the issue because the question on
appeal was whether the district court properly determined that the Military Commission had
jurisdiction over the saboteurs. Quirin, 37 U.S. at 47.
66 Boris I. Bittker, The World War II German Saboteurs' Case and Writs of Certiorari
Before Judgment By the Court of Appeals: A Tale of Nunc Pro Tunc Jurisdiction, 14 CONS.
CoMMENT. 431,432 (1997).
67 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
68 Id. ("[N]either the Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy aliens forecloses
consideration by the courts of petitioners' contentions that the Constitution and laws of the
United States constitutionally enacted forbid their trial by military commission."). The Court
explained that there was nothing in the Proclamation that precluded access to the courts for
determining whether the Proclamation applies to the particular case. l The Court cited
Milligan to demonstrate that the Supreme Court has certiorari jurisdiction to review a lower
court's refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus even when the President and Congress have
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Id at 24. See supra note 34-45 and
accompanying text for review of Milligan. The Court also cites as authority for upholding the
Military Commission that "[d]uring the Civil War the military commission was extensively
used for the trial of offenses against the law of war." Quirin, 317 U.S. at 32 n. 10. See supra note
36 and accompanying text (noting that the Milligan Court found that neither the President nor
Congress could suspend the writ of habeas corpus to challenge jurisdiction of the commissions).
69 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26-28. See also REDISH-SHERRY, Chapter 2: Congressional Power
to Control Federal Jurisdiction, FEDERAL CoURTS 106-92 (5th ed. 2002) for a discussion of
Congress's ability to limit the jurisdiction of Courts established under Article IH of the
Constitution. Professor Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen of The Ohio State University Moritz
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punish offenses against the law of nations.70 Congress expressly provided in the
Articles of War that military commissions "shall" have jurisdiction to try
offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases.71 The Court also
recognized that the law of nations, particularly the law of war, permitted military
commissions to hear violations of the law of war.72 The Court did not address the
question of whether a President would have authority to establish military
commissions without congressional authorization. 73
Once the Court decided that the President did have authority to establish the
military commissions, the Court addressed whether the Nazi defendants were
within the permissible jurisdictional scope of the military commissions, as
authorized by the Articles of War.74 The Court stated that to find jurisdiction of
the military commission proper, it needed to find both that the acts charged were
offenses that the law of war deemed within the jurisdiction of military
commissions, and that the Constitution did not require that the particular offense,
be tried before a jury.75
College of Law has queried whether the Executive has the authority to establish military
tribunals in light of the fact that Article HI delegates to Congress the power to establish lower
federal courts. Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Professor of Law, Lecture on Federal Courts at
The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law (Aug. 22, 26-27, 2002). Arguably, Congress
established military tribunals as lower federal courts and provided that those tribunals would
have jurisdiction over violations of the law of war when it enacted the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 821-946 (2000). See infra Part IV for a discussion of
the role in setting up individual military tribunals that Congress gave to the Executive.
70 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26-28.
71 Id The Articles recognized that military commissions appointed by military command
constituted an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of
war not ordinarily tried by courts-martial. Article 12, 10 U.S.C. § 1483 (1946) (repealed 1950);
Article 15, 10 U.S.C. § 1486 (1946) (repealed 1950). Articles 38 and 46 authorized the
President to prescribe the procedure for military commissions with limited reservations. 10
U.S.C. §§ 1509, 1517 (1946) (repealed 1950). Articles 81 and 82 authorized trial, either by
courts-martial or military commission, of those charged with relieving, harboring, or
corresponding with the enemy, and those charged with spying. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1553, 1554 (1946)
(repealed 1950).
72 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26-28.
73 Id at 29. The Court in fact explicitly stated that "[lit is unnecessary for present
purposes to determine to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional
power to create military commissions without the support of Congressional legislation." Id
74 Id
75 Id According to the Court, not all acts that international law deemed offenses against
the law of war would be triable by military commission in the United States. The United States
does not recognize jurisdiction of military commissions over acts that the federal courts do not
recognize as violations of the law of war or offenses that the Constitution requires be tried only
by a jury. Id at 29.
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First, the Court found that the saboteurs had committed offenses over which
the laws of war allowed military commission jurisdiction.76 The Court recognized
that Congress had not enacted a statute that defined the "law of war."77 Rather,
Congress "adopted by reference the sufficiently precise definition of international
law."78 The Court determined that under international law the defendants' acts-
coming onto American soil in their military uniform, and then changing into
civilian clothes with the intent to destroy American life and property-violated
the law of war.79
Second, the Court found that actions by unlawful belligerents were not
offenses that the Constitution requires be tried by a jury.80 Although not expressly
excepted from the Sixth Amendment's requirement of trial by jury,81 the Court
76 Id. at 48.
77 Id at 30.
78 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.
79 Id at 31. The Court looked to the 1907 Hague Convention, Great Britain's War Office
Manual of Military Law, and several studies on international law to determine the law of
nations. Id at 30 n.7. Under the Hague Convention, citizens as well as aliens could be unlawful
belligerents. Id at 37. After reviewing the Hague Convention, the Court determined that under
international law only "unlawful combatants" were subject to the jurisdiction of military
commissions, and even then only for "acts which render their belligerency unlawful." Id at 31.
The Court also looked to the Rules of Land Warfare promulgated by the War Department for
the international law standard of an unlawful belligerent. Id at 37.
One of the saboteurs, petitioner Haupt, claimed that he became a citizen of the United
States when his parents were naturalized and that he never lost that citizenship. Id at 20.
Consequently, the Court examined whether under international law a citizen was subject to
jurisdiction of a military commission. Id at 37-38. The Court noted that, under the Hague
Convention, "[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy
government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are
enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war." Id The
Court found, therefore, that "[clitizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not
relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of
the law of war," nor are persons who commit hostile acts against the United States "any the less
belligerents if... they have not... entered the theater or zone of active military operations." Id
Under the laws of war, the Court noted that Haupt's citizenship would not matter to the
jurisdiction of the Commission. Id
According to the Court, the Fifteenth Article of War demonstrates the United States'
recognition of this international law. Id at 35-36. The Court went on to specify that "[i]t is
without significance that petitioners were not alleged to have borne conventional weapons or
that their proposed hostile acts did not necessarily contemplate collision with the Armed Forces
of the United States." Id at 37. Al Qaeda terrorists who hijacked planes on September 11, 2001,
to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon therefore would fit under "unlawful
belligerent" statutes under the Quirin logic.
80 Id at 40. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text for discussion of why the
Quirin Court held that the Constitution does not require a jury trial under military commissions.
81 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Actions are not included in "cases arising in the land or naval
forces." Quit/n, 317 U.S. at 40.
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concluded that the writers of the Constitution never contemplated that trials
against unlawful belligerents would require a trial by jury.82 The Court
emphasized that when the founding fathers wrote the Constitution, they were
aware that military commissions, which did not provide for trial by jury, tried
unlawful belligerents. 83 The Court held that, under the Articles of War, the
Constitution, and the international laws of war, a military commission properly
had jurisdiction over the Nazi saboteurs.84
C. Important Points to Remember from the Quirin Decision
There are four points to remember from Quirin that are important in the next
section's analysis of President Bush's military commissions. First, when
evaluating whether jurisdiction over the saboteurs was proper, the Quirin Court
focused on the Articles of War enacted by Congress. The Court noted that
because President Roosevelt had cited the Articles of War in his Order creating
the military commission, his commissions were bound to the jurisdictional scope
provided for in the Articles of War.85 Namely, military commissions could only
have jurisdiction over unlawful belligerents.86 A person may violate the law of
war without necessarily becoming an unlawful belligerent.87 When lawful
belligerents violate the law of war, they must be tried by court martial or regular
civilian court.88
Second, the Court looked to international law to define the law of war, and
consequently to define the scope of the military commission. Importantly, the
82 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 41.
83 Id ; see also U.S. CONST. art. Im, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI. The
Court recites statements of international law, the Continental Congress, and the founding fathers
to demonstrate that when the founding fathers drafted the Constitution they did not include
unlawful belligerents in the cases that require trial by jury. Those statements assert that spies are
subject to military commissions. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 41-43. The Court pointed to other
situations in which it held that offenses did not require jury trial despite the lack of express
exception from the Fifth Amendment. lId at 39-40.
General George Washington convened a military commission to try Major Andre, a
general to the British Army, for sneaking behind American lines in disguise, by simply sending
a letter of instructions to the soldiers holding Andre. Marmoa et al, supra note 6, at 70.
84 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
85 See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
86 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
87 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 135; see also Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions, Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3.
88 See supra note 86.
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Court found that both citizens and aliens are subject to military commissions
when they violate the law of war.89
Third, the Court emphasized that the Nazi defendants were charged with
violations that were clearly within the laws of war, which Congress recognized as
federal law. The jurisdictional key to finding a clear violation was that the
defendants entered the United States disguised as civilians with the intent to cause
harm to the United States.9°
Finally, the Court did not take a position on what procedural requirements, if
any, a military commission must abide by, either under the laws of the United
States or under the law of war.91
IV. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH'S MILITARY CoMMIssIoNS
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a military order92 asserting
his authority to establish military commissions to try suspected terrorists. 9 3 This
November 13 Order has generated a wave of commentary on whether the
President's military commissions are constitutional. 94 The arguments that
President Bush's November 13 Order is unconstitutional can be divided into two
main criticisms: (1) President Bush exceeded his constitutional authority as Chief
Executive Officer and Commander-in-Chief and therefore violated the doctrine of
separation of powers when he claimed the right to establish military commissions
without express approval from Congress; and (2) President Bush's November 13
89 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38 (noting that under the Hague Convention, citizens as well as
aliens could be unlawful belligerents). The Quirin Court went so far as to distinguish Milligan.
The Court stated that the Articles of War subjected any person who violated the law of war to
trial by military commission, regardless of whether that person was a citizen and the civil courts
were open. Il at 24, 37, 48. See infra Part IV.B.1 for a discussion of jurisdictional limitations
on military commissions created under the laws of war.
90 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 36-37.
91 See id at 46-48.
92 See supra note 4 for the distinction between a military order and an executive order.
93 See supra notes 4-5.
94 More than forty New York Times articles were written specifically on the November
13 Order between November 13 and December 31, 2001. See, e.g., William Glaberson, A
Nation Challenged: The Justice System: Critics' Attack on Tribunals Turns to Law Among
Nations, N.Y. TIES, Dec. 26, 2001, at B 1; Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Right and
Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at A27; Neil A. Lewis, The Investigation: Ashcroft Offers
Accounting of 641 Charged or Held, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at Al; James Orenstein,
Rooting Out Terrorists Just Became Harder, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at A35; Jeffrey Rosen,
The Nation: What Price Security?: Testing the Resilience of American Values, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2001, § 4, at 1; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should Be Tried Before the World,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A23; Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, White House Push on
Security Steps Bypasses Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at Al.
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Order violates constitutional due process requirements by impermissibly
infringing on the civil liberties of the persons subject to the Order.
In defending the November 13 Order, the Bush Administration has
repeatedly referred to the fact that presidents of the past had established military
commissions.95 This section examines whether Lincoln and Roosevelt's use of
military commissions supports the constitutionality of President Bush's authority
to establish military commissions and his authority to adopt the specific
procedures provided for in his November 13 Order. As the following discussion
reveals, President Bush's military commissions are likely to withstand
constitutional attack when read in light of limiting regulations.
A. Does President Bush Have the Authority to Establish Military
Commissions?
President Bush has claimed that the foundations for his authority lie in both
his role as Commander-in-Chief 96 and in statutory provisions. He also points to
the actions of Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt, both of whom, he asserts,
established military commissions without asking for Congress's permission9 7
95 President Bush said on November 19: 'I would remind those who don't understand the
decision I made [to establish military commissions] that Franklin Roosevelt made the same
decision in World War H1. Those were extraordinary times as well." Stephen Robinson, Bush
Embraces Big Government After All, NEWS.TEL.EGRAPH.CO.UK, at
http://www.portal.telegraph.co.uk/newstmain.jhtml?xml=/news2001/11/22/wbush122.xml
(Nov. 22, 2001); see also Steven Lee Myers & Neil A. Lewis, Assurances Offered about
Military Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at BIO (noting that the Department of Defense
would review military commission precedents in American history when writing the
procedures for the military commission); see, e.g., Alberto R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full
and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27 (noting that military commissions were used
during the Civil War and World War 11).
96 The Bush Administration claims that as Commander-in-Chief the President has
authority to establish military commissions without Congress's express authorization. See, e.g.,
Elisabeth Bumiller, Military Tribunals Needed in Difficult Time, Bush Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
20, 2001, at B5; Neil A. Lewis, Ashcroft Defends Antiterror Plan; Says Criticism May Aid U.S.
Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at A 1; David E. Sanger, President Defends Military Tribunals
In Terrorist Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at Al.
97 See supra note 95. Like President Bush, President Lincoln and President Roosevelt
cited their constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces as a source of their
authority to create military commissions and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
See November 13 Order, supra note 4; Proclamation No. 2561: Denying Certain Enemies
Access to the Courts of the United States, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 309 (1968),
reprinted in, 56 Stat. 1964 (1942). President Lincoln referred to his authority as Commander-in-
Chief when defending his establishment of military trials and suspension of habeas corpus. See
supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. President Lincoln repeatedly emphasized that he
believed the Constitution gave Congress the authority to suspend habeas corpus and to establish
military trials, even during times of war. See, e.g., id Nevertheless, he also felt that as
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This note will look to both the Civil War precedent and the World War H
precedent, to evaluate (1) whether President Bush has the authority to establish
military commissions under his Commander-in-Chief powers and without the
express authorization of Congress; and (2) whether President Bush has the
authority to establish military commissions under legislation enacted by
Congress.
1. Civil War Precedent
The Milligan Court explicitly held that the Constitution, in particular the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief, did not give a president the authority
to establish a military commission without the authorization of Congress.98 The
Court also held that even Congress could not authorize the President to establish a
military commission to hear cases of civilians who violated civil laws when civil
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the President had the authority to suspend habeas
corpus and to establish military commissions when the national security required such
measures. See KOMMERS & FINN, supra note 17, at 291. Yet when a circuit court ruled
Lincoln's acts unconstitutional, he continued to try civilians and military alike under military
commissions and to suspend habeas corpus. See supra text accompanying note 26. In some
sense, then, Lincoln seemed to view his authority as Commander-in-Chief above the authority
of the courts. Congress's ratification of Lincoln's actions could have meant either that Congress
acknowledged his authority to act when Congress was not in session or that Congress
acknowledged the need for military courts and the suspension of habeas corpus. See supra notes
31-33 and accompanying text; see also Military Order of July 2, 1942: Appointment of a
Military Commission, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 1308 (1968). In his 1942 Order
establishing the military commission to try the German saboteurs, President Roosevelt wrote,
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of
America and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, by virtue of the
authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, do hereby
proclaim ..." Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 309.
98 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866). The Court noted that "[i]f there was
law to justify this military trial, it is not our province to interfere; if there was not, it is our duty
to declare the nullity of the whole proceedings." Id. at 119. The "law" that the Court referred to
was an express congressional act. Id
If Milligan is read narrowly and limited to its facts, the holding stands for the rule that the
President does not have the authority to try citizens for civil crimes in military commissions
without the express authorization of Congress while the civil courts are open. Because Bush's
Military Order excludes citizens, the narrow Milligan holding would not apply. However,
Milligan is not necessarily so narrow. Although the Milligan Court's finding specifically relates
to citizens (because Milligan was a citizen of the United States), the Court's holding seems to
apply to all civilians. The Court in Milligan stated: "The Constitution of the United States is a
law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times...." Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120 (emphasis
added).
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courts were open.99 The Court implied, however, that Congress or the President
could establish a military commission to hear violations of the laws of war when
civil courts were open. l°0
Military commissions can hear three types of cases.101 Lincoln authorized the
second type: a commission to try civilians for actions that did not violate the laws
of war.102 The Milligan decision complied with the common law rule that
military commissions may only try civil crimes when the civil courts are
closed. 103 That the Union used military commissions extensively during the Civil
War to try offenses against the law of war further demonstrates that the Milligan
holding is limited to one type of case triable under military commission-trial of
civilians for violation of civil law.104
The Bush administration has claimed that the November 13 Order only
applies to the third type of cases covered by military commissions-violations of
the laws of war.10 5 If this is so, arguably Milligan's holding that the President
does not have independent authority to establish military commissions does not
apply to Bush's November 13 Order. There is debate, however, over whether the
text of the November 13 Order itself is limited to violations of the law of war,
since the Order states that "it is necessary for individuals subject to this order...
to be detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and
other applicable laws by military tribunals."'106 Individuals subject to the order
99 Id. at 121-22. The Court held that "no usage of war could sanction a military trial...
for any offence whatever of a citizen in civil life, in nowise connected with the military
service." Id.
10 See Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 119-20, 121-23.
101 See supra note 6 (outlining the three types of cases military commissions can hear).
102 See Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121-22. On the other hand, readers of Milligan
could interpret some sections of the Court's holding as saying that the President never has the
authority to establish military commissions without Congress's express authorization because
the Constitution gives Congress, not the President, the authority to establish inferior courts. See
supra note 21 accompanying text. The Court noted that the President "is controlled by law, and
has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the laws; and there is 'no
unwritten criminal code to which resort can be had as a source of jurisdiction.' Id at 121.
103 See Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121-22.
104 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942). Under the November 13 Order the
military commissions have exclusive jurisdiction over individuals subject to the Order. In
distinguishing its holding from Milligan, the Quirin Court stated, "During the Civil War the
military commission was extensively used for the trials of offenses against the law of war." Id
at31 n.10.
105 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 96 (noting that Ashcroft defended the Bush November 13
Order by explicitly assuring Congress that the military commissions would only try war
crimes); Neil A. Lewis, Rules on Tribunal Require Unanimity on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 2001, at Al.
106 November 13 Order, supra note 4, § l(e), at 57,833 (emphasis added); see, e.g., DOJ
Oversight. Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Before
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cannot "seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding" in any court other than the
military commission created under the November 13 Order. 10 7 Therefore, on its
face, Bush's November 13 Order covers civil trials, in addition to war crimes
trials, committed by any non-citizens regardless of whether they are civilians or
members of a military. To the extent that Bush's military commissions have
jurisdiction over civilians for civil crimes, the November 13 Order would be
constitutional under the Milligan holding. Again, the Milligan Court noted that
there might be an argument that the "laws and usages of war" would authorize the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to establish a commission independently.10 8
the S. Comm on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (statement of Dr. Neal Katyal, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center) (Nov. 28, 2001), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm? id=126&witjid=72 (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
107 November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 7(b)(1)-(2), at 57,835-36.
108 Id. Note that if President Bush's military commissions are established under the laws
of war, the 1949 Geneva Conventions require that the commission only have jurisdiction over
persons connected to a state involved in a declared war or an armed conflict with the United
States. Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 11; see also infra note 137 and
accompanying text.
Some critiques assert that, by claiming independent authority to establish military
commissions, the President violates the separation of powers doctrine by usurping the law-
making duties and judicial review duties that the Constitution delegated to the legislative and
the judicial branches, respectively. See, e.g., supra note 8. They emphasize that the Framers
purposely divided power among three branches to prevent the tyranny of one. Therefore, they
assert that the separation of powers doctrine requires the President to receive the express
permission of Congress to establish a military commission. Katyal, supra note 106. These
scholars assert that Congress could give the President that power in one of two ways: (1)
through a declaration of war, or (2) by permission to establish military commissions. Id. They
note that congressional authorization would legitimize the commissions and would make the
constitutionality of their holdings much more secure. Id
The Declaration of Independence lists several complaints that the American colonists had
against King George Ill of England. Among those complaints, the writers noted: "He has
affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power"; the King was
guilty of "depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury"; and the King had
"made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and
Payment of their Salaries." Katyal, supra note 106. King George 111 likely found his actions
necessary to prevent an uprising in the colonies, two thousand miles away from England.
Critics of President Bush's November 13 Order note that there is no civil check over the
commissions-no jury trials--and that the military judges will be members of the executive
branch subject to the President's favor. See, e.g., supra notes 3, 8 and accompanying text.
Arguably, President Bush is acting tyrannically, similar to the way in which the founding
fathers characterized King George Ii in the Declaration of Independence.
In Milligan, the Supreme Court warned against diminishing the safeguards provided for by
the Constitution's separation of powers in times of war:
This nation, as experience has proved, cannot always remain at peace, and has no right to
expect that it will always have wise and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles
of the Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt
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Nevertheless, the Court declined to consider this argument because the laws of
war did not apply when a citizen violated a civil law. °9
2. The World War H Precedent
The Quirin Court expressly stated that it did not answer the question of
whether the President independently had the authority to establish a military
commission.110 There are several clues in the Quirin decision, however, that
indicate a President has the authority to establish a military commission without
the express authorization of Congress.
First, according to the Quirin Court, President Roosevelt had the authority to
establish military commissions because Congress previously had authorized the
President to establish military commissions when it enacted the Articles of
War."' l Specifically, the Court referred to Article 15112 and Article 38113 as
of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln; and if this right is
conceded, and the calamities of war again befall us, the dangers to human liberty are
frightful to contemplate .... [Our fathers] knew-the history of the world told them--the
nation they were founding, be its existence short or long, would be involved in war, how
often or how long continued, human foresight could not tell; and that unlimited power,
wherever lodged at such a time, was especially hazardous to freem-en. For this, and other
equally weighty reasons, they secured the inheritance they had fought to maintain, by
incorporating in a written constitution the safeguards which time had proved were essential
to its preservation.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866). The Milligan Court found conviction of
Lambdin P. Milligan unconstitutional because it violated separation of powers. l at 130. As a
result, the Court freed Milligan despite that if "his guilt had been ascertained by an established
court and impartial jury, he deserved severe punishment" because conspiracies such as
Milligan's to overthrow the United States deserve "the heaviest penalties of the law." Id.
President Bush's November 13 Order gives the executive branch powers normally divided
among the three branches: the power to establish military commissions as well as their
jurisdiction and procedure; the power to try persons under military commissions and review
those decisions; and the power to enforce the commissions' decisions. Katyal, supra note 106.
Interestingly, military commanders first established military commissions because the
commanders no longer wished to be solely responsible for the trial of unlawful belligerents
such as spies and pirates. Marmoa et al., supra note 6, at 8. Therefore, commanders restricted
their unlimited power and began using boards of officers to help try those deemed guilty of
offenses against the law of war. Id
109 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121-22.
110 Expare Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942).
111 The Supreme Court declared that the legislative sections Roosevelt cited did give the
President authority to establish military commissions. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26-28.
112 10 U.S.C. § 1486 (1946) (repealed 1950). See infra note 136 for the full text of
Article 15.
113 10 U.S.C. § 1509 (1946) (repealed 1950). See infra note 150 for the full text of
Article 38.
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giving the President authority to establish military commissions. 114 In the
November 13 Order, President Bush supported his authority to establish military
commissions by citing provisions of the current UCMJ" l5 that are almost
identical to the Articles President Roosevelt cited."16 According to the Quirin
114 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26-28, 35, 46. Although President Roosevelt cited "the authority
vested in me by ... the statutes of the United States" as one source of authority for his Military
Order creating the military commission, unlike President Bush he did not articulate which
statutory provisions supported his Order. Proclamation No. 2561: Denying Certain Enemies
Access to the Courts of the United States, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 309 (1968),
reprinted in, 56 Stat. 1964 (1942); see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 46.
115 President Bush's November 13 Order cites three statutory sections as sources of
authority for the Order: (1) the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution; (2) 10
U.S.C. § 821; and (3) 10 U.S.C. § 836. November 13 Order, supra note 4. The Authorization
for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution does not expressly mention military commissions; it
merely gives the President the authority to use "military force" as he deems necessary in
bringing perpetrators of the September 11 attacks to justice. Joint Resolution, supra note 1, at
225.
The Constitution gives Congress the authority to make rules for the government of the
land and naval forces. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. In 1950, Congress replaced the Articles of
War with the UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
116 See infra notes 136, 150. President Roosevelt cited the Articles of War; President
Bush cited the UCMJ. Id The key to the statutory sections to which both President Roosevelt
and President Bush cite is that military commissions may be used to try violations of the law of
war. See infra note 127. One main difference between President Roosevelt's Order and
President Bush's November 13 Order is that President Roosevelt's Order was also backed by a
formal declaration of war. Katyal, supra note 106. Both Lincoln and Roosevelt established their
commissions after Congress had formally declared war. Id A formal declaration of war
logically activates the laws of war. In fact, all the military commissions established in the
United States before Bush's November 13 Order were established when Congress had declared
war or when Congress had expressly authorized military commissions. Id
Since World War H, however, Congress has ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which
state that the laws of war also apply during a period of armed conflict or aggression. Gregory P.
Noone, The History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to World War 11, 47 NAvAL L. REv.
176, 196 n. 117 (2000) (noting that "the United States ratified the four Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 on 2 August 1955"). The four Geneva Conventions are as follows:
(1) Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
(2) Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,75
U.N.T.S. 85;
(3) Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135; and
(4) Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Tune of War, August 12,
1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
George H. Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 764,764 n.2 (1981).
Within one week of the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center,
Congress authorized military action to the extent the President deemed necessary. Joint
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Court's logic, therefore, President Bush did not need express authorization from
Congress to establish military commissions because Congress previously had
authorized the President to establish military commissions under the UCMJ.117
The similarities between the Code provisions that President Roosevelt cited and
the Code provisions that President Bush cited indicate that President Bush is
justified in referring to Roosevelt's creation of military commissions as precedent
for his authority to create military commissions without additional congressional
assent.11
8
Second, the Quirin Court emphasized that military commissions predated the
Constitution.119 The Quirin Court held that the Framers did not intend to change
the pre-Constitution common law rules of military commissions. 120 Under the
Resolution, supra note 1. However, Congress neither explicitly authorized military
commissions nor formally declared war. After the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban organization,
which controlled Afghanistan, refused to surrender the al Qaeda leaders, the United States, with
the help of the United Kingdom, launched a military campaign against Taliban forces in
Afghanistan. President George W. Bush, Remarks on the Start of Military Action in
Afghanistan (Oct. 7, 2001), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNewsstrike
bushtrans01 1007.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
117 Congress could always amend the UCMJ to restrict the President's authority. See
infra note 208 (discussing the "later in time" doctrine).
118 Although President Bush seems to have the authority to create military commissions
under the UCMJ and the laws of war, the laws of war also limit permissible personal and
subject matter jurisdiction of any military commission he creates. See infra Part I.B.
119 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39.
120 Id. at 41, 45. The Court reasoned that if the Framers had intended to change the
common law on military commissions, they would have expressly stated so in the Constitution.
l at 41-42. Because the Constitution implicitly authorized military commissions, the Court
concluded "that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever authority was
conferred by the Constitution to try offenses against the law of war by military commission."
Il at45.
Quirin was not the only case in which the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does
not expressly prohibit military commissions. For example, the Supreme Court held in Madsen
v. Kinsella that "[s]ince our nation's earliest days, such commissions have been constitutionally
recognized agencies for meeting many urgent governmental responsibilities related to war."
343 U.S. 341, 346 (1952). That American military leaders had utilized military commissions
before the Constitution was created implies that the Constitution permits military commissions.
Marmoa et al., supra note 6, at 12.
Similarly, the United Nations has expressed the opinion that statutory authority did not
create military commissions. Marmoa et al., supra note 6, at 13 n.33. Rather, statutory law
recognized military commissions. Il The United Nations interpreted the Quirin, Yamashita,
and Homma cases as agreeing with this point. l The U.N. authors stated:
In the exercise of the power conferred upon it by the constitution [sic] to "define and
punish... offenses against the Law of Nations," of which the law of war is a part, the
United States Congress has by a statute, the Articles of War, recognised the " Military
Commission " appointed by military command, as it had previously existed in United
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common law before the Constitution, high-ranking military commanders
established military commissions. 121 Although in the Constitution the Framers
gave Congress the authority to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme [sic]
Court,"1 22 and to "define and punish 123 ... Offenses against the Law of Nations,"
the Constitution does not expressly state that military commanders do not have
the authority to establish military commissions. Under the Quirin Court's logic,
therefore, it follows that the Constitution did not prevent the pre-Constitution
common law authority of military commanders to establish military commissions
when they thought necessary. 124 Consequently, by giving the Commander-in-
Chief power to the President, the Constitution seems to have given the President
the authority to establish military commissions. 125
States Army practice, as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offences
against the law of war.
I UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 112
(8th ed. 1947) (emphasis added). According to the U.N., therefore, the Supreme Court did not
hold that only Congress had the authority to establish military commissions; rather, Congress
had the authority to recognize military commissions. Id.
121 In 1776 General George Washington charged Captain Nathan Hale with spying and
tried him in a military commission. Colonel A. Wigfall Green, The Military Commission, 42
AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 832-33 (1942). General Washington also convened a military commission
in 1780 to try Major John Andr6 of the British Army on the charge of acting as a spy. Marmoa
et al., supra note 6, at 70. General Washington convened the commission to try Major Andr6 by
simply sending a letter of instructions to the soldiers holding Andre. Id; see also supra note 83
and accompanying text.
According to Colonel A. Wigfall Green, a military commission may have two sources of
authority: common law and statutory. Green, supra, at 834. The law of war establishes the
common law authority for the military commission. Id. Under the common law, a superior
military commander usually appoints a military commission. Id. Unless there is a "directive of
superior authority to the contrary," the military commission is free to create its own rules of
procedure. Id. A commission may also have statutory authority, such as when Congress
provides for military commissions in the Articles of War. Id. Colonel Green notes, however,
that statutory authority is usually only necessary to confer specific powers on the military
commission. Id. The miffitary commission is only bound by the restrictions and procedure set
forth in statutes-such as the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial-when it is
appointed under statutory authority. Id.
122 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
123 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
124 President Lincoln seems to have held a similar view. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text (quoting Lincoln's assertion that "it cannot be believed the framers of the
[Constitution] intended, that in every case, the danger should run its course, until Congress
could be called together .... ").
125 Because Article I lays out the powers and duties of the legislative branch, it is also
possible to argue that the mere fact that the Framers mentioned military commissions in Article
I impliedly vests Congress with the authority to establish military commissions. Such an
argument would follow Justice Taney's logic in Merryman. See supra note 22 and
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
B. Procedure and Due Process of the Commissions
President Bush's authority to establish military commissions either under his
power as Commander-in-Chief or under specific legislation does not diminish the
fact that the procedure of the established commissions must comport with
constitutional due process. A major constitutional criticism of President Bush's
November 13 Order is that it eliminates fundamental and unalienable freedoms
and civil rights for defendants, especially the millions of legal aliens in the United
States who are subject to the Order.126 Nevertheless, there is a chance that the
Supreme Court would interpret the November 13 Order to be constitutional under
the Secretary of Defense's limiting regulations, 127 even if the President does not
amend or Congress does not restrict the Order.128
accompanying text (noting Justice Taney's assertion that, because the constitutional provision
authorizing suspension of habeas corpus is located in Article I, only an act of Congress could
authorize the suspension).
126 See, e.g., Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 8; Lewis, supra note 3.
Critics have noted that U.S. federal courts have afforded constitutional rights to
international criminals-including pirates, slave traders, hijackers, and terrorists-when the
United States tried those criminals in federal court. Id. at 40; Harold Koh, We Have the Right
Courts for Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at A39. Federal courts have even
successfully tried and convicted al Qaeda members. Committee on Military Affairs, supra note
1, at 40.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has expressly stated that the Court extends constitutional
protections to aliens. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886) (noting that the
Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to protection of citizens, and that the United States had
signed a treaty with China to enforce its citizens' rights). "But, in extending constitutional
protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the alien's
presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act." Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950) (emphasis added). Today, however, international treaties
and customary international law have expanded the scope of permissible jurisdiction beyond
the mere presence of the defendant in the United States. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Professor of
Law, Lecture on International Dispute Resolution at The Ohio State University Moritz College
of Law (Nov. 8, 2001) (discussing Kadic v. Karadid, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), in which the
court exercised universal rather than territorial jurisdiction over a foreign human rights abuser).
Other commentators have noted that due process rights afforded to defendants in federal courts
would hinder the government from effectively fighting the war on terrorism and thereby
ensuring national security. See Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 40.
127 Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by
Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
Mar. 21, 2002, http://news.corporate.fmdlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/dod032102milcomordl.pdf
[hereinafter March Regulations or Regulations] (last visited Oct. 20, 2002).
128 See Lewis, supra note 128 (reviewing Congress members' statements that the
regulations seem to be addressing constitutional concerns about the November 13 Order). There
is no guarantee the Supreme Court would even be willing to hear a constitutional challenge to
Bush's commission, even though under Quirin the Court has the right to hear a habeas corpus
challenge to the jurisdiction of the military commissions. See generally John F. O'Connor, The
1252 [Vol. 63:1225
2002] TRIALS IN TIMES OF WAR 1253
Other than affirming that defendants always have the right to challenge
jurisdiction of a commission through a habeas corpus petition, the Milligan and
Quirin Courts offer little express guidance on the minimum required procedure of
military commissions. 129 Nevertheless, both cases seem to suggest that the
President has the authority to establish the jurisdiction, method, and procedures of
military commissions unless Congress provides otherwise. 130 Consequently, if
Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REv. 161 (2000)
(discussing the Supreme Court's tendency to defer to the executive branch's decisions during
times of war).
129 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1942) (holding that the Court need not inquire
into whether Congress could restrict the procedure of a military commission). According to the
counsel for the government in Milligan, there was no precedent on the procedure of military
commissions. His brief queried:
How is a military commission organized? What shall be the number and rank of its
members? What offences come within its jurisdiction? What is its code of procedure?
How shall witnesses be compelled to attend it? Is it perjury for a witness to swear falsely?
What is the function of the judge-advocate .... What is the nature of their
punishments?... To none of these questions can the Attorney-General or any one make a
reply, for there is no law on the subject.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 141-42 (1866). The Milligan Court did not even
mention the procedure of the military commissions in its opinion. Id.
The Milligan and Quirin Courts did hold, however, that federal courts always have the
power to hear habeas corpus petitions to review the jurisdiction of military commissions.
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 130-31 (noting that Milligan was entitled to discharge because
under the March 3, 1863 Act the military commission did not have jurisdiction over Milligan).
The Quirin Court explicitly held that the President could not eliminate a defendant's right to the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, even if that defendant was an unlawful, alien belligerent.
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. According to the Supreme Court, all defendants had the right to
challenge the military commission's jurisdiction over them. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25. Yet the
Court did not find that under Roosevelt's Order the same defendants had the right to appeal for
a conviction by the military commission. Id.
130 Milligan both focused on the fact that, under the March 3, 1863 Act, Congress said
"no" to military commission jurisdiction, and that it left open the possibility that the President
could establish military commissions to hear violations of the law of war. See supra notes 100-
03 and accompanying text. The Quirin Court also focused on congressional limitations but left
open the President's authority to act independently of Congress in establishing military
commissions. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has previously indicated that the President cannot act in contradiction
of Congress's express statements. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952) (the "Steel Seizure Case"). President Truman seized steel mills under strike to
ensure a supply of steel to the armed forces fighting the Korean War. The Court found the
seizure unconstitutional because the President acted directly contrary to the specific intent of
Congress in a matter subject to congressional power. Id. at 609-10.
Justice Jackson wrote in his famous concurring opinion:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
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the Department of Defense Regulations comply with limitations Congress
previously placed on the procedure of military commissions, the procedure of
President Bush's military commissions may be constitutional. 131
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter ....
Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized
with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional
system.
Id. at 637-38. Justice Jackson went on to note that neither the President's executive powers nor
his power as Commander-in-Chief could give him the power to act contrary to Congress's
express statement, even in time of war. Id. at 645.
Military commissions are not necessarily subject to standard constitutional minimum due
process requirements. Supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the Quirin Court
holding that military commissions are exempt from the Sixth Amendment due process
guarantees).
131 Months before the Secretary of Defense issued its regulation, Administration
employees issued reports of leaked drafts of the regulations indicating that the Administration
intended to write limiting regulations that would comply with congressional statements in the
UCMJ and the USA Patriot Act. Thomas M. DeFrank, Retreat on Military Tribunals: After
Uproar, White House to Ease Terror Trial Rules, DAILY NEws (New York), Jan. 6, 2002, at 24.
For example, the leaked regulations required unanimous death penalty verdicts, mandatory
appeals, a presumption of innocence, and possibly civilian judges on the commission. Id.
Even if the Court were to find some sections of the November 13 Order unconstitutional,
the entire Order may not necessarily be struck down. See Committee on Military Affairs, supra
note 1, at 26. The Court in Quirin declared the provision of Roosevelt's Order that denied
habeas corpus unconstitutional. Id. The Court did not discuss severability but nevertheless
upheld the Order as written despite its unconstitutional provision denying habeas corpus. Id.
Neither the Roosevelt Order nor the Bush November 13 Order included severability provisions.
Id. Both Orders did, however, include a provision allowing for amendment by regulations. See
Proclamation, supra note 51; November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 4, at 57,834-35. The Quirin
Court may have inferred a severability provision from the provision for regulation.
Consequently, the current Court may also infer a severability provision in Bush's November 13
Order.
There is also the possibility, however, that the current Court may distinguish Quirin.
Although the provision in President Bush's November 13 Order that denies habeas corpus is
nearly identical to President Roosevelt's 1942 Order, there is a significant difference. The 1942
Order specifically provided for amendment of the denial of habeas corpus:
[S]uch persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding
directly or indirectly, or have any such remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf, in the
courts of the United States, or of its States, territories, and possessions, except under such
regulations as the Attorney General, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may from
time to time prescribe.
Proclamation, supra note 51, at 5101 (emphasis added).
President Bush's November 13 Order, on the other hand, generally states that the Secretary
of Defense has the authority to issue regulations. November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 4(b), at
57,834. The general grant of authority to issue regulations is in section 4 of the November 13
Order, while the provision denying habeas corpus is in section 7 of the Order. Id. §§ 4(b),
7(b)(2), at 57,384-86. As written, the November 13 Order seems to indicate that even if the
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Congress has not expressly regulated the procedure of military commissions
since September 11. Nevertheless, this note proposes that there are three statutory
provisions that limit the scope of permissible military commission procedure:
first, Article 21 of the UCMJ; 132 second, Article 36 of the UCMJ; 133 and third,
section 412 of the Patriot Act. 134
1. Article 21 of the UCMJ
In his November 13 Order, President Bush cited as basis for his authority
Article 21 of the UCMJ, 1 3 5 which is nearly identical to an Article of War the
Secretary of Defense issues regulations, persons subject to the Order still will not be able to file
habeas corpus petitions.
Scholars have argued that even if Congress does not restrict the President's ability to create
the procedure and jurisdiction for the military commission, the President does not have
unlimited discretion over procedure and jurisdiction. See, e.g., 11 Op. Att'y Gen 298 (1865).
According to scholars, the common law of military tribunals has established default rules, or
minimum procedural and jurisdictional requirements. l Consequently, to exceed the standard
scope of military commissions, the President would need congressional authority. Id
One United States Attorney General, Attorney General Speed, agreed that the President
was restricted by the common law of military tribunals. Id According to Speed:
A military tribunal exists under and according to the Constitution in time of war. Congress
may prescribe how all such tribunals are to be constituted, what shall be their jurisdiction,
and mode of procedure. Should Congress fail to create such tribunals, then, under the
Constitution, they must be constituted according to the laws and usages of civilized
warfare.
Id According to this view, as Commander-in-Chief, the President can recognize the need for a
military commission. If Congress does not act, the default procedural rules of the laws of war
apply. Congressional action is only necessary to alter these default rules as to jurisdiction and
procedure.
132 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
133 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000).
134 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act [sic] of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350-52 (2001).
Additionally, Article 18 of the UCMJ seems to indicate that Congress expressly intended
that general courts-martial and military commissions have concurrent jurisdiction over
violations of the law of war. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000). The November 13 Order's grant of
exclusive jurisdiction to military commissions conflicts with this express intent. Committee on
Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 19.
135 Article 21 of the UCMJ states that the Codes' creation of jurisdiction in courts-martial
to try persons subject to the UCMJ does "not deprive military commissions... of concurrent
jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be
tried by military commissions... or other military tribunals." 10 U.S.C. § 821. Article 21 does
not expressly give the President authority to establish a military commission, but merely states
that statutes and the law of war define the permissible jurisdiction of military commissions. Id
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Quinn Court recognized as authorizing President Roosevelt's military
commission.136 Article 21 notes that military commissions have jurisdiction
"with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be
tried by military commissions."1 37 Congress therefore limited the personal and
subject matter jurisdiction of military commissions to persons and offenses that
either Congress expressly authorizes or that the laws of war permit.138 Congress
has not enacted legislation that expressly authorizes jurisdiction of military
commissions over particular persons or offenses. 139 However, international
treaties have limited the personal and subject matter jurisdiction of military
136 November 13 Order, supra note 4; Military Order of July 2, 1942: Appointment of a
Military Commission, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 1308 (1968). Article 21of the UCMJ
states:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive
military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction
with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by
military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.
10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000). Article 15 of the Articles of War states:
The provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall not be
construed as depriving military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of
concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of
war may be triable by such military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals.
10 U.S.C. § 1488 (1946) (repealed 1950).
137 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (emphasis added). Under the law of war, a military
commission may have personal jurisdiction over a person who does not commit a war crime.
An occupying power "could use military commissions to try persons within occupied territory
pending establishment of civil government" as the United States often did in the post-World
War II occupation of Germany and Japan. Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 10.
See also supra note 6 for discussion of the three types of cases that a military commission may
try.
138 In addition to the UCMJ requirement that military commissions follow the procedural
requirements of the international law of war, the United States' ratification of international
treaties that regulate the laws of war, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, binds the United
States to the international procedural requirements for military commissions. See infra Part
V.A.
Congress has also recognized military commissions in passing. The House Judiciary
Committee made a statement in the legislative history of the War Crimes Act of 1996 that the
Act "is not intended to affect in any way the jurisdiction of any courts-martial, military
commission, or other military tribunal under any article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
or under the law of war or the law of nations." H.R. REP. No. 104-698, at 12 (1996).
139 Congress has only recognized military commissions without detailing the
jurisdictional requirements. Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 9.
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commissions permitted under the law of war. 14 0 Under the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, military commissions have jurisdiction over persons who violate the
laws of war while participating in armed conflict between contracting states.141
Persons who are not involved in such armed conflicts consequently are not
subject to jurisdiction of the military commissions. Congress authorized use of
force against those involved in the September 11 attacks. 142 Congress specifically
authorized use of force to fight terrorism, and the President has utilized this force
in Afghanistan. 143 Therefore, a state of armed conflict existed when the President
issued his November 13 Order. The laws of war consequently applied to the
armed conflict in Afghanistan. 144 Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's terrorist
organization, controlled, organized, financed, and trained manpower for the
September 11 attacks. 145 Arguably, therefore, members of the al Qaeda
organization are directly involved in the armed conflict regardless of whether they
are in Afghanistan. 146
The broad language of President Bush's November 13 Order covers
individuals who are not connected to the armed conflict in Afghanistan. 147 The
140 Id at 13 (noting that "classic 'offenders' subject to the law of war, including the
Geneva Protocols," are enemy aliens and members of an armed body).
141 Id
142 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 4.
143 Id
144 Id.
145 Id at 3-4.
146 Id. at 3.
147 The November 13 Order covers any person who President Bush believes meets the
following three requirements:
(a) Is a non-citizen;
(b) The United States has an interest in subjecting the person to the Order, and
(c) One of the following:
(1) Is a member of al Qaeda; or
(2) Prepared, committed, aided, or conspired to commit acts of international
terrorism and those acts caused, threatened to cause or aimed to cause injury or
adverse effects on the United States citizens, national security, foreign policy, or
economy; or
(3) Knowingly harbored one or more of the individuals described in (1) or (2).
November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 2(a)(1)(i)-(iii), at 57,834. One legal scholar has suggested
that the non-citizen provision may be pivotal to the constitutionality of the November 13 Order,
because historically the Supreme Court has held that non-citizens, particularly illegal aliens,
have significantly reduced rights to constitutional freedoms and that enemy combatants have no
constitutional rights. Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Professor of Law, Lecture on Federal
Courts at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law (Aug. 26, 2001). But see infra note
199 (quoting Quirin as stating the fact that enemy alien defendants did not foreclose judicial
consideration of the constitutionality of their trial by military commission); infra note 247
(discussing that the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that all persons, whether a citizen
or an alien, a civilian or in the military, deserve equal protection under the Constitution and the
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November 13 Order's terms are in fact broad enough to cover any non-citizen
who is in any way connected to past or present terrorist activities, not just terrorist
activities connected to September 11 or al Qaeda. t48 Therefore, as written,
President Bush's November 13 Order violates Congress's requirement that
military commissions only have jurisdiction over persons that the laws of war
pelrmit.149
2. Article 36 of the UCMJ
President Bush also cited in his November 13 Order Article 36 of the UCMJ,
which is nearly identical to another provision in the Articles of War that President
Roosevelt cited as a basis for his authority to create the Order.150 Subject to only
law of war); cf Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting
that the Frst Amendment protects citizens' rights to know that their government is acting fairly
in deportation of non-citizens and consequently prohibits the federal government from holding
secret deportation hearings despite that the Bill of Rights does not protect non-citizens to the
same extent it protects citizens).
Under the Geneva Conventions, the law of war only applies when there is a declared war
or an armed conflict between states. Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 11. Al
Qaeda is a terrorist organization based in Afghanistan; the organization itself does not represent
a state under international law. Id at 3, 13-14. But see id at 13 (noting that some have argued
that al Qaeda may have been controlling the Taliban government). This note suggests, however,
that because Osama bin Laden, the leader of the al Qaeda organization that was behind the
September 11 attacks, operated out of Afghanistan, all members of al Qaeda are directly
connected to the September 11 attacks and to Afghanistan, and therefore the armed conflict.
President Bush explained to Congress that although al Qaeda operates in at least sixty nations,
including the United States, Afghanistan is al Qaeda's organizational base because Osama bin
Laden, the organization's head, is in Afghanistan. Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1,
at 3 n.12. Bush contends that he initiated an armed conflict with Afghanistan not just because
Afghanistan would not turn over leaders of al Qaeda, but also because that country was the
organizational base of al Qaeda. Id.
148 Critics have noted that the November 13 Order covers persons such as Northern
Ireland leaders and Nelson Mandela. See, e.g., Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at
16. Representatives of the Bush Administration have stated, however, that the Administration
does not interpret the language of the November 13 Order as broadly as the text allows. See,
e.g., infra note 187.
149 See infra note 158.
150 November 13 Order, supra note 4; Military Order of July 2, 1942: Appointment of a
Military Commission, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 1308 (1968). Article 36 of the UCMJ
states:
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising
under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commissions and other military
tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by
regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and
the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States
district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.
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two restrictions, Article 36 allows a president to prescribe regulations for the
procedure of military commissions.
First, the President must apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence
generally required in criminal trials in United States federal courts "so far as he
considers practicable."']5 1 President Bush stated in the findings section of his
November 13 Order that international terrorism so endangered the safety of the
United States that "it is not practicable" to apply the principles of law and the
rules of evidence generally recognized in federal courts.152
While Congress gave the President discretion under Article 36 to evaluate the
circumstances and decide what procedure would be practical for military
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable.
10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000). Article 38 of the Articles of War states:
The President may, by regulations, which he may modify from time to time, prescibe the
procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry,
military commissions, and other military tribunals, which regulations shall insofar as he
shall deem practicable, apply the rules of evidence recognized in the trial of criminal cases
in the district courts of the United States: Provided, That nothing contrary to or
inconsistent with these articles shall be so prescribed: Provided further, That all rules made
in pursuance of this article shall be laid before the Congress annually.
10 U.S.C. § 1509 (1946) (repealed 1950) (emphasis in original).
151 10 U.S.C. § 836(2000).
152 November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 1(f), at 57,833. This provision of the November
13 Order states in full:
Given the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international
terrorism, and to the extent provided by and under this order, I find consistent with section
836 of title 10, United States Code, that it is not practicable to apply in military
commissions under this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.
Id.
Critics have questioned whether President Bush was correct in his judgment that the
principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in federal courts are not
practicable in fighting the war on terrorism. See, e.g., Committee on Military Affairs, supra
note 1, at 18. Nevertheless, Article 36 seems to give the President great discretion in this
decision. Id.
But critics point out that federal courts have successfully tried and convicted international
terrorists, including al Qaeda members who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993. l at 40.
In fact, the federal government has already obtained an indictment of bin Laden in the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York. Id
On the other hand, supporters of the November 13 Order have argued that military
commissions are necessary to ensure convictions of terrorists that may not be obtainable in a
federal criminal court. See, e.g., Terrorists on Trial-l, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2001, at A18 ("As
recently as 1996, the Clinton Administration rejected Sudan's offer to turn over Osama bin
Laden because it didn't think it had enough evidence to convict him in a criminal court. A
military tribunal would certainly have come in handy then.").
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commissions, this discretion is not absolute. Article 36 places a second limitation
on the President's ability to prescribe procedures. Any procedure the President
prescribes, even if he finds the principles of law and rules of evidence not
practicable, "may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.' 53 Chapter
10 provides required procedures for the courts-martial, another form of military
tribunal. 154 Under Article 36, then, the procedures of the President's military
commission cannot be inconsistent with the procedures established for courts-
martial.155
The Code's requirement that military commission procedure cannot be
"inconsistent" does not necessarily mean that the procedure for the military
commission must be identical to the courts-martial procedure. 156 Rather, a strict
textual interpretation of "may not be . .. inconsistent," indicates that the
President's regulations must be in "agreement or harmony" with courts-martial
regulations. 157 This note suggests, therefore, that the procedure of President
Bush's military commissions may differ from courts-martial procedure so long as
the military commission procedure is not incompatible with the essential elements
of due process provided for in the UCMJ for courts-martial.
Military courts-martial do not afford defendants the same due process
protections that civilian courts afford defendants, and consequently under U.S.
law neither must President Bush's military commissions. Military courts-martial,
like the November 13 Order, permit trial without a jury in a secure environment
such as a naval vessel or military base.' 58 Members of the military serve on
153 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000); Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 18.
154 As noted earlier, courts-martial usually hear cases in which members of the armed
services violate their own military codes. See supra note 6. Under the UCMJ, however, courts-
martial have concurrent jurisdiction with military commissions over "offenders and offenses
that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions." 10 U.S.C. § 821
(2000).
155 In Quirin, the Supreme Court expressly refused to decide whether a military
commission trial must comply with the procedure Congress established for courts-martial. Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1942).
President Bush often cites precedent, but he has not yet noted that most military
commissions established by the United States to try war criminals during and after the World
War II adopted procedural rules that were similar to courts-martial procedure. Marmoa et al.,
supra note 6, at 74-75.
156 If the procedure and regulations for courts-martial and military commissions had to be
identical, courts-martial and military commissions would seem to be identical tribunals since,
under the UCMJ, courts-martial and military commissions have concurrent jurisdiction. There
must be some differences between the tribunals, or else there would be no need to refer to them
with separate names.
157 WEBs R's I NEw COLLEGE DIcnoNARY 561 (2d ed. 1995).
158 November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 4(c)(2), at 57,835 (stating that the military
commission will sit "as the triers of both fact and law"); Committee on Military Affairs, supra
note 1, at 41. The Constitution expressly states that members of the military are not subject to
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courts-martial just as members of the military will presumably make up the
military commissions. 159 The UCMJ, like the November 13 Order, even has
provisions for presenting material in secret when necessary. '
There are, however, essential due process protections that courts-martial still
ensure. 161 As written, Bush's November 13 Order is not in harmony with several
of those essential due process protections. 162 For example, the UCMJ does not
permit the military to confine or arrest a person unless it has probable cause,163
the Fifth Amendment right to a jury trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. That any trial by a courts-
martial does not require a jury is significant, however, because jurisdiction of courts-martial is
not limited to members of the military. Courts-marital also have concurrent jurisdiction over
cases that military commissions have jurisdiction to try. See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000). Military
commissions have jurisdiction to try any person who has violated the laws of war, whether
civilian or military, national or foreign. See supra notes 55; infra note 222 and accompanying
text.
159 10 U.S.C. §§ 825-826 (2000); November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 4, at 57,834-35.
Under President Bush's November 13 Order, all defendants will be assigned a military attorney.
Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 41. Under the Regulations, however, "[t]he
Accused may also retain the services of a civilian attorney of the Accused's own choosing and
at no expense to the United States Government," provided the attorney is a United States
citizen; admitted to the bar in federal court, a state, district, territory, or possession of the United
States; has not been sanctioned by any court, bar, or government authority; and is approved for
access to "information classified at the level SECRET or higher," and has signed a written
agreement to comply with the applicable regulations and instructions for counsel. March
Regulations, supra note 127, § 4(C)(3)(b).
160 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 41 n.101; November 13 Order, supra
note 4, § 4(c)(4). An interesting point is that in courts-martial all of the attorneys must be of a
rank that is cleared to see secret information. Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 41
n.101. The Department of Defense Regulations, in compliance with the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, permit defendants to choose their own attorneys. March Regulations, supra note
127, § 4(C)(3). If the defendant chooses a civilian attorney, the defendant's counsel may not
have clearance to see all of the classified information. See id, § 4(C)(3) (stating that a civilian
attorney need only be approved for "access to information classified at the level SECRET'); id
§ 6(B)(3) ("A decision to close a proceeding or portion thereof may include a decision to
exclude the Accused, Civilian Defense Counsel, or any other person ...."); see also Committee
on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 41 n.101. The November 13 Order itself specifically states
that "[n]othing in this order shall be construed to... authorize the disclosure of state secrets to
any person not otherwise authorized to have access to them .... November 13 Order, supra
note 4, § 7(a)(1).
161 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 41.
162 See DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism:
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (Dec. 6, 2001), http://judiciary.senate.gov/
member_statement.cfm?id=121&witid=50 (last visited Oct. 21, 2001) (noting that "as written,
the President's order outlines a process that is far different than our military system of justice").
163 10 U.S.C. § 809(d) (2000). At trial those who have signed the charges against
defendants must take an oath that they have personal knowledge of or have investigated the
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and an accuser must conduct a "thorough and impartial investigation" of the
charges before a court-martial will consider charges. 164 The November 13 Order,
on the other hand, allows President Bush to detain or try a person under military
commission if he determines "from time to time" that the person meets the
requirements of the Order. 165
When the military arrests or confines anyone prior to trial, the UCMJ requires
that it immediately inform those confined of what specific wrong they are
accused and take immediate steps to try them or dismiss the charges and release
them. 166 The November 13 Order as written allows the Administration to detain
persons indefinitely without charges, trial, or the right to seek remedy in federal or
state CoUrts. 16 7 A court-martial cannot try a person accused of an offense if five
years have passed since the person allegedly committed the offense. 168 A military
commission may, on the other hand, try any person who has ever met the
description of a person subject to the November 13 Order without a statute of
limitations. 169
If a court-martial convenes to try an individual, the accused has the right
under the UCMJ to choose his or her own defense counsel. 170 However, the
November 13 Order does not provide for the defendant's right to select his or her
own attorney. 17 1 A court-martial cannot convict a person of an offense subject to
the death penalty, or sentence a person to the death penalty without a unanimous
matters set forth in the charge, and that everything stated in the charge is true to the best of their
knowledge or belief. 10 U.S.C. § 830(a) (2000).
164 10 U.S.C. § 832(a) (2000).
165 November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 2(a), at 57,834. The November 13 Order does
not require that the President conduct any investigation, let alone a "thorough and impartial
investigation," before he deems a person subject to the Order. Id.
166 Id
167 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 19. The November 13 Order only
states that when persons are detained they must be treated humanely, allowed free exercise of
religion, and adhere to the Secretary of Defense's rules. November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 3,
at 57,834. The November 13 Order allows the Administration to detain persons inside or
outside the United States. Id
168 10 U.S.C. § 843(b)(1) (2000). Section 843(b)(1), the statute of limitation section,
states in full:
Except as otherwise provided in this section (article), a person charged with an offense is
not liable to be tried by court-martial if the offense was committed more than five years
before the receipt of sworn charges and specifications by an officer exercising summary
court-martial jurisdiction over the command.
Id.
169 See November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 2, at 57,834.
170 10 U.S.C. § 827(a)(2) (2000).
171 See November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 4(c)(5), at 57,835, for the defendant's right to
an attorney.
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vote of all members of the court-martial present.' 72 Under the November 13
Order as written, however, a military commission may convict for a crime subject
to the death penalty and sentence a person to death with a vote of only two-thirds
of the members present.' 73 Persons accused have the right to appeal and the right
to a public trial when possible.174 The November 13 Order prohibits both the
right to appeal 175 and the right to a public trial. 176 The UCMJ also gives
defendants several rights during trial that the November 13 Order does not
provide for, but which the Order also does not expressly prohibit. For example,
under the UCMJ the accused also has a right to be free from self-incrimination, 177
to have an impartial trial, 178 and to have an equal opportunity to obtain witnesses
and other evidence. 179
The Bush Administration has represented to the public that the military
commissions will provide the same protections as the well-respected United
States' military justice system, or courts-martial.180 As demonstrated above,
172 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(1) (2000). Life sentences require a three-fourths vote. Id
§ 852(b)(2). All other convictions and sentences require a two-thirds vote. Id § 852(a)(2),
(b)(3). Interestingly, when President Roosevelt established his military commission to try the
eight Nazi saboteurs, courts-martial required concurrence of only two-thirds of the members of
the court present. Marmoa et al., supra note 6, at 75.
173 November 13 Order, supra note 4, §§ 4(a), 4(c)(6), 4(c)(7), at 57,834-35.
174 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 2, 41. Additionally, the UCMJ
requires that both courts-martial and military commissions have a court reporter record the
proceedings and testimony before the commission. 10 U.S.C. § 828 (2000). The UCMJ does
not state, however, that the record must be made public. Id
175 November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 7(b), at 57,835-36.
176 Id § 4(c)(4), at 57,835.
177 10 U.S.C. § 831(a) (2000).
178 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2000). One of the main criticisms of President Bush's November 13
Order and the Regulations is that the military commissions they provide for will not be
impartial because the commission members sit at the President's pleasure. See, e.g., Tribe,
supra note 8 (noting that the President as chief executive would control every aspect of the
military commissions, from appointments to sentencing); Martin, supra note 8; Memorandum,
Interested Persons Memorandum Regarding the "Military Commission Order No. 1," Timothy
H. Edgar, ACLU Legislative Counsel, at
http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity. cfm?ID=10150&c=l 11 (Apr. 16,
2002) (noting that "[t]he procedures outlined by Military Commission Order No. 1 utterly fail
to provide for an impartial and independent tribunal"). The UCMJ addresses impartiality under
§ 837. 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2000). The UCMJ specifically states that no authority convening a
courts-martial, which could include the President, Secretary of State, or commanding officer,
may censure or reprimand any member of the proceeding because of the outcome. Id The
UCMJ does not speak to the inherent influence a member of the military has from its
commanding officers. Id
179 10 U.S.C. § 846 (2000).
180 See, e.g., Gonzales, supra note 95. Some critics have argued, however, that in
actuality the Bush Administration has misrepresented to the public that under the November 13
2002] 1263
1264 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1225
several aspects of the November 13 Order's outlined procedures are inconsistent
with the essential elements of due process Congress expressly required under the
UCMJ.' 8 ' However, the Secretary of Defense's rules indicate that the Bush
Administration plans to comply with the UCMJ required courts-martial procedure
because the Regulations largely adhere to the UCMJ minimum requirements.
182
Regardless of how close the Regulations come to harmonizing the Military
Order the military commission's procedure will comply with court-martial procedure. See, e.g.,
147 CONG. REC. S13,276 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2001) (statement of Senator Lugar) ("[T]he White
House counsel has explained that military commissions will be conducted like courts-martial
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice."); William Glaberson, Tribunal v. Court-Martial:
Matter of Perception, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at 1B6. Mr. Gonzales, legal counsel for the
White House, misrepresented several other aspects of the military commissions provided for in
the November 13 Order. Gonzales, supra note 95. For example, he claimed only "active
supporters of al Qaeda or other international terrorist organizations targeting the United States"
would be subject to the commissions, when in reality the scope of the November 13 Order
covers any suspected terrorist, whether or not a member of an organization targeting the United
States, as well as persons who in any way aid or harbor such suspected terrorists. Id; November
13 Order, supra note 4, § 2, at 57,834. Additionally, Mr. Gonzales claimed that the military
commission trials would not be secret; that "the [O]rder preserves judicial review;" and that the
Order does not suspend the privilege of habeas corpus. Gonzales, supra note 95.
181 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 18, 41. Under the UCMJ, Congress
does not require that military commissions have procedures consistent with courts-martial
procedures; nor is there any good reason not to follow the courts-martial procedure. Infra note
211. The minimum due process requirements of the courts-martial procedure will not hinder the
efficiency and ability to protect classified information that President Bush insists are essential
characteristics of military commissions. Id For example, courts-martial allow for the secrecy
and speed that President Bush claims is necessary to try suspected terrorists. Id.
182 For example, the regulations provide that a defendant has the right to choose a defense
counsel. March Regulations, supra note 127, § 4(C)(3)(b). Cf supra note 160 (noting that
civilian lawyers may not have access to all secret information). Under the regulations, a
unanimous verdict from seven-member commissions will be required for any death sentence.
March Regulations, supra note 127, § 6(F). The regulations provide for a review of verdicts and
sentences by appeal to a three-member review panel. Id § 6(H)(4). Additionally, the regulation
provides that the accused will be afforded a public trial where possible. Id § 5(0). Finally, the
regulation gives defendants the right to be free from self-incrimination, to have an impartial
trial, and to have an equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and other evidence. Id §§ 5(E), 5(F),
5(H), 6(B)(2).
The regulation does not, however, resolve all discrepancies between the November 13
Order and the UCMJ minimum due process requirements. For example, the regulation does not
require probable cause to confine or arrest a person subject to the Order. March Regulations,
supra note 127. Additionally, nothing in the regulation prevents a person from being confined
indefinitely without trial. Id Finally, there are still questions of impartiality and independence
of the commissions, since under the regulations the "Appointing Authority," which may be the
President, the Secretary of Defense, or a designee, will have ultimate control over the entire
military commission proceeding, including the appointing of commissioners, the review panel,
the selection of the Chief Prosecutor and Chief Defense Counsel, and the ultimate decision in
the case. Id §§ 2,4, 6(H).
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Tribunal Procedures with the UCMJ minimum requirements, and despite the
presumption that the Supreme Court may find that the Defense Department's
Regulations adhere to the UCMJ minimum due process requirements, 183 this note
suggests that those rights subject to the November 13 Order will not be protected
until the Order itself is in harmony with the essential due process protections
provided for under courts-martial. Although the Bush Administration has
declared its intention to adhere to the UCMJ minimum due process
requirements, 184 critics have argued that the Bush Administration's "trust us"
position is not good enough to protect the American people from erosion of the
Constitution.1 85 According to these critics, Congress should limit the November
13 Order by statute to prevent establishing a precedent that the text of the Order as
written is constitutional.
This note agrees that the November 13 Order cannot stand as written. Even if
the Bush Administration can be trusted not to infringe on its promise that persons
subject to the November 13 Order will have minimum due process rights, future
Administrations may not be so trustworthy. President Bush's November 13 Order
is itself an example of how future presidents may expand precedent; President
Bush has used President Roosevelt's military commission as justification for his
own military order, despite significant differences in procedure and
circumstances.' 86 If Congress allows the November 13 Order to stand as written,
it has set a precedent for future presidents to use military commissions in broader
ways. 187
183 See supra note 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Quirin Court's finding
that although Roosevelt's Order expressly suspended the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Court
interpreted the Order to allow Habeas Corpus). But see supra note 31 (noting distinctions
between Presidents Bush and Roosevelt's orders that may lead the Supreme Court to
distinguish Quirin).
184 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
185 Elizabeth Olson, World Briefing United Nations: Rights Official Criticizes U.S.
Tribunal Plan, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 8, 2001, at A6 (noting United Nations Human Rights
Commissioner Mary Robinson's criticism of the Bush Administration's commission for
infringing democratic rights, stating that it was "not enough to say trust me as a government");
see, e.g., Robin Toner, Senators Spar Carefully in Hearing on Security, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2001, at B7 (noting that Senator Edward M. Kennedy argued that Bush's order allowing for
military commissions had "enormous potential for abuse").
186 See supra notes 95, 155.
187 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 106. The regulations seem to leave the door open to
application in line with the November 13 Order, rather than the more limiting Regulations. The
regulations specifically state:
In the event of any inconsistency between the President's Military Order and this
Order, including any supplementary regulations or instructions issued [by the
Appointing Authority], the provisions of the President's Military Order shall govern.
In the event of any inconsistency between this Order and any regulations or
instructions issued [by the Appointing Authority], the provisions of this Order shall
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3. Section 412 of the Patriot Act
Congress adopted the Patriot Act1 88 on October 26, 2001, to give the federal
government the law enforcement and intelligence-gathering tools necessary to
govern.
March Regulations, supra note 127, § 7(B). Additionally, the regulation explicitly states that
"[n1o provision in this Order shall be construed to be a requirement of the United States
Constitution." Id § 10. Consequently, the Secretary of Defense has stated that he can remove
any of the provisions of the Regulation at any time without violating the Constitution.
188USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 8
U.S.C.A. § 1226a (West Supp. 2002)). Section 412 states in pertinent part:
Sec. 412. Mandatory Detention of Suspected Terrorists; Habeas Corpus; Judicial Review.
(a) IN GENERAL.-The Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) is
amended by inserting after section 236 the following:
"SEC. 236A. (a) DETENTION OF TERRORIST ALIENS.-
"(1) CUSTODY.-The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien
who is certified under paragraph (3).
"(2) RELEASE.-Except as provided in paragraphs (5) and (6), the
Attorney General shall maintain custody of such an alien until the alien is
removed from the United States. Except as provided in paragraph (6), such
custody shall be maintained irrespective of any relief from removal for
which the alien may be eligible, or any relief from removal granted the
alien, until the Attorney General determines that the alien is no longer an
alien who may be certified under paragraph (3). If the alien is finally
determined not to be removable, detention pursuant to this subsection shall
terminate.
"(3) CERTIFICATION.-The Attorney General may certify an alien
under this paragraph if the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to
believe that the alien-
(A) is described in section 212(a)(3)(A)(i), 212(a)(3XA)(iii),
212(a)(3)(B), 237(a)(4)(A)(i), 237(a)(4)(A)(iii), or
237(a)(4)(B); or
(B) is engaged in any other activity that endangers the
national security of the United States.
"(5) COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS.-The Attorney General
shall place an alien detained under paragraph (1) in removal proceedings,
or shall charge the alien with a criminal offense, not later than 7 days after
the commencement of such detention. If the requirement of the preceding
sentence is not satisfied, the Attorney General shall release the alien.
"(6) LIMITATION ON INDEFINITE DETENTION.-An alien detained
solely under paragraph (1) who has not been removed under section
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fight the war on terrorism.' 89 Section 412190 of the Act provides that when the
federal government detains aliens subject to the Act, it must criminally charge
241(a)(1)(A), and whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable
future, may be detained for additional periods of up to six months only if
the release of the alien will threaten the national security of the United
States or the safety of the community or any person.
"(7) REVIEW OF CERTIFICATION.-The Attorney General shall
review the certification made under paragraph (3) every 6 months. If the
Attorney General determines, in the Attorney General's discretion, that the
certification should be revoked, the alien may be released on such
conditions as the Attorney General deems appropriate, unless such release
is otherwise prohibited by law. The alien may request each 6 months in
writing that the Attorney General reconsider the certification and may
submit documents or other evidence in support of that request.
(b) HABEAS CORPUS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Judicial review of any action or decision relating to
this section (including judicial review of the merits of a determination
made under subsection (a)(3) or (a)(6)) is available exclusively in
habeas corpus proceedings consistent with this subsection. Except as
provided in the preceding sentence, no court shall have jurisdiction to
review, by habeas corpus petition or otherwise, any such action or
decision.
"(2) APPLICATION.-
"(A) IN GENERAL-Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, including section 2241(a) of title 28, United States
Code, habeas corpus proceedings described in paragraph (1)
may be initiated only by an application filed with--
"(i) the Supreme Court;
"(ii) any justice of the Supreme Court;
"(iii) any district court otherwise having jurisdiction
to entertain it.
"(3) APPEALS-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including
section 2253 of title 28, in habeas corpus proceedings described in
paragraph (1) before a circuit or district judge, the final order shall be
subject to review, on appeal, by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. There shall be no right of appeal in such
proceedings to any other circuit court of appeals.
"(4) RULE OF DECISION.-The law applied by the Supreme Court and
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
shall be regarded as the rule of decision in habeas corpus proceedings
described in paragraph (1).
Ma
189 See Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 23.
190 Section 412 is titled, "Mandatory Detention of Suspected Terrorists; Habeas Corpus;
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them, or begin removal proceedings, within seven days of detention. 191 If release
of the alien would endanger the national security of the United States, then the
Attorney General may continue the detention.192 To continue detaining the alien,
the Attorney General must recertify every six months that releasing the alien
would endanger national security. 19 3
In section 412 Congress specifically gives aliens the right to habeas corpus
review of the federal government's decision to detain them. 194 The alien may
submit an application for habeas corpus review to the Supreme Court, any Justice
of the Supreme Court, any circuit judge of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, or
any district court with jurisdiction.195 Additionally, Congress gives aliens the
right to appeal district court decisions to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. 196
President Bush's November 13 Order on its face deprives aliens of the right
to the privilege of habeas corpus and the right to appeal, 197 thereby contradicting
section 412 of the Patriot Act.198 The Administration has stated, however, that
President Bush did not intend the November 13 Order to suspend habeas corpus
Judicial Review." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a (West Supp. 2002)
191 See id § 1226a(a)(5). Foreign states have already begun to criticize the United States
for failing to notify states when their citizens are detained under the Patriot Act. See, e.g.,
Sanger, supra note 96 (noting that Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher has complained to
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell that the United States has not given Egypt the names of
Egyptian citizens arrested or detained). The United States has an obligation under the Vienna
Convention on Counselor Relations to give foreign citizens the absolute right to consular and
diplomatic assistance from their state. See LeGrand Case (Germany v. U.S.), 2001 I.CJ. 104
(June 27), available at http'J/www.icj-cij.orgicjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/
igusjjudgment_ 20010625.htm.
192 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(6) (West Supp. 2002).
193 Id. § 1226a(aM7).
194 Id. § 1226a(b)(1).
195 Itt § 1226a(b)(2)(A).
196 Id § 1226a(b)(3).
197 The November 13 Order authorizes the President to create military commissions to try
persons subject to the Order. November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 7(b), at 57,835-36. Military
commissions created under the November 13 Order have exclusive jurisdiction over persons
subject to the Order. Id. § 7(b)(1), at 57,835. Any person subject to the Order, whether tried or
simply detained, is not permitted to seek "any remedy" or "maintain any proceeding" in any
United States federal or state court, any foreign court, or any international tribunal. Id. § 7(b)(2),
at 57,835-36. Critics have argued that this broad prohibition on any proceeding or remedy
denies the detainees the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Committee on Military
Affairs, supra note 1, at 23; see also supra note 129.
198 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a(b) (West Supp. 2002). Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, questioned why the Bush Administration both requested that
Congress pass the Patriot Act as quickly as possible and then, without prior notice to Congress,
issued the November 13 Order that contradicts the Act. Committee on Military Affairs, supra
note 1, at 23 n.63 (citing Senator L.eahy's comments on Meet the Press (NBC television
broadcast, Nov. 25, 2001)).
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and he has no intention of denying detained persons the privilege of habeas
corpus.' 99 The March Regulations do not mention the privilege of habeas
corpus.
200
199 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 25. The Bush Administration has
gone so far as to state that the November 13 Order as written does not deny persons subject to
the Order the writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Gonzales; supra note 95 (President Bush's
counsel noting that persons tried under military commissions have the right to file a habeas
corpus petition). The Administration has also noted that the Quirin Court, which examined
nearly identical provisions in President Roosevelt's Order that seemed to suspended habeas
corpus, found the provision constitutional:
Under the order, anyone arrested, detained or tried in the United States by a military
commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction
through a habeas corpus proceeding in federal court. The language of the order is similar to
the language of a military tribunal order issued by President Franklin Roosevelt that was
construed by the Supreme Court to permit habeas corpus review.
Gonzales, supra note 95.
On its face, President Roosevelt's Order suspended the writ of habeas corpus for all
purposes. President Roosevelt issued a Proclamation and a Military Order on July 2, 1942.
Proclamation No. 2561: Denying Certain Enemies Access to the Courts of the United States, 3
C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 309 (1968), reprinted in, 56 Stat. 1964 (1942); Exec. Order
No. 9185, 3 C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 1171 (1968). In the Proclamation, Roosevelt
denied citizens and residents of nations at war with the United States access to courts of the
United States if they entered or tried to enter the United States to commit hostile or warlike acts.
l In the same Proclamation, Roosevelt stated that such persons would "be subject to the law of
war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals." lId Nevertheless, the Court did not strike down
the Order as unconstitutional or require the Order to be amended. Under the Military Order,
Roosevelt appointed a military commission to try the Nazi saboteurs under the law of war and
the Articles of War. Military Order of July 2, 1942: Appointment of a Military Commission, 3
C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 1308 (1968). Nevertheless, when the Court reviewed the
saboteurs' writs of habeas corpus, it reviewed the validity of the Proclamation and the Order
establishing the military commission as if they were one. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 22-23
(1942). The Court simply limited the Order by interpretation. Id at 24-25. The Quirin Court
stated:
[Tlhere is certainly nothing in the Proclamation to preclude access to the courts for
determining its applicability to the particular case. And neither the Proclamation nor the
fact that they are enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners'
contentions that the Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted
forbid their trial by military commission.
Id. at 25. Similarly, President Bush's November 13 Order as written suspends the right of
habeas corpus for all purposes. See supra note 197. Therefore, if the Supreme Court adheres to
the Quirin precedent, it will uphold a defendant's right to file a habeas corpus petition to
challenge a military commission's jurisdiction, but it will not declare the November 13 Order
unconstitutional on its face. Such a holding seems less likely in light of the Regulations, which
do not protect a defendant's right to habeas corpus under the November 13 Order. See March
Regulations, supra note 127 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 183-87 and
accompanying text (arguing that the safeguarding of minimum due process requirements
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V. THE NEED TO THINK GLOBALLY
Even if President Bush's November 13 Order is constitutional, 20 1 the Bush
Administration must look beyond the United States Constitution to succeed in the
"worldwide campaign" against terrorism.20 2 There are two fundamental reasons
that this note recommends that the United States adhere to international law when
conducting trials in the war against terrorism. First, the United States is bound by
international law, both under the Constitution and as a state in the international
system.203 If the Bush Administration chooses to violate the treaties and
customary international law that bind the United States, the United States will be
subject to enforcement abroad. Second, complying with international law is good
policy. Because the war on terrorism is a worldwide campaign, the United States
cannot win the war without international assistance. If the Bush Administration
refuses to comply with international law, it will alienate the very countries that the
United States needs as allies. Refusing to comply with international law will also
undermine principles of order and stability that benefit the United States.
A. International Law Binds the United States
The November 13 Order, when interpreted in light of the Secretary of
Defense's limiting regulations,204 is most likely constitutional.20 5 The
Constitution, however, is not the only law that President Bush's military
should not be left to speculated Supreme Court interpretation).
On the other hand, there is evidence that the Bush Administration did intend to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus for persons subject to the November 13 Order. See Committee on
Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 25 n.68. The Bush Administration seems to have issued the
November 13 Order to achieve the full range of powers that it originally sought in the Patriot
Act but for which it could not secure Congressional approval. Id. at 23 n.64 (noting that
Attorney General Ashcroft originally attempted to get Congress to suspend habeas corpus in the
Patriot Act).
200 See March Regulations, supra note 127.
201 See supra note 128 (discussing whether the Supreme Court will hear a jurisdictional
challenge of Bush's military commission).
202 President Bush and President Megawati of Indonesia, President Building a Worldwide
Campaign Against Terrorism, Remarks at a Photo Opportunity, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/20010919-1.html (Sept. 19, 2001). Approximately one week after the
attacks, President Bush promised that "there will be a campaign against terrorist activity, a
worldwide campaign. And there is an outpouring of support for such a campaign." Id. After
November 13, however, foreign states are becoming more cautious in that support. See, e.g.,
infra notes 218, 242.
203 See infra Part V.A.
204 See supra Part IV.
205 See supra Part IV.
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commissions must be judged against.20 6 The Constitution states that treaties are
the supreme law of the land, and the Supreme Court held in The Paquete
Habana20 7 that international law is part of the law of the United States.20 8 Under
Paquete Habana, international law, not national law, is controlling because
President Bush's November 13 Order implicates international borders. 209
Not only is international law generally a part of U.S. law, but President
Bush's November 13 Order explicitly states that the military commission will try
persons subject to the Order under the law of war, 210 which is governed by
international law.2 11 Additionally, the UCMJ sections that President Bush cited as
sources of his authority to establish military commissions state that military
206 See, e.g., supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the Congress
defined the laws of war in terms of international law).
207 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
208 Id at 700 (holding that international law is part of customary U.S. law). President
Roosevelt recognized that the President cannot violate an express prohibition by Congress. See
supra note 54. When Congress ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it in effect prohibited the
President from violating the jurisdictional and minimal procedural requirements for military
commissions established by the Conventions. See Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1,
at 30-31.
Additionally, the UCMJ states that military commissions have jurisdiction over "offenders
or offenses that by statute oi by the law of war may be tried by military commissions... or
other military tribunals." 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000). Because Congress has not expressly passed a
statute establishing a military commission, under the UCMJ military commissions have
jurisdiction only when the law of war gives military commissions jurisdiction. Id; see supra
Part V.B. 1.
U.S. courts recognize that international law, both customary and treaty, is just as much a
part of federal law as Congressional statutes. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAmS AND THE
UNrrED STATES CONSTITUTION 209-11 (2d ed. 1996). Consequently, if a statute is passed after
a treaty, that statute supersedes the treaty just as a later statute supersedes an earlier. See id This
is known as the "later in time" doctrine. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lecture on International
Dispute Resolution at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law (Nov. 28, 2001).
Under the "later in time" doctrine, if Congress passes legislation permitting military
commissions to violate international law, that legislation would trump both customary
international law and treaties. kL The United States would still be subject under international
law, however, to reparations for violating ratified conventions and treaties. Id
209 See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. The November 13 Order implicates
international borders. For example, certain provisions require that state citizens of foreign states
are subject to the Order. See November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 2(a), at 57,834. Additionally,
the November 13 Order states that the military commissions may be held anywhere around the
globe. Id § 4(c)(1), at 57,835.
210 See November 13 Order, supra note 4, § l(e), at 57,833 (noting that persons subject to
the Order will be "tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military
tribunals"). As noted earlier, there is a question as to whether the November 13 Order is limited
to international law, given that "other applicable laws" may include national law. See supra
note 106 and accompanying text.
211 Marmoa et al., supra note 6, at 44.
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commissions have jurisdiction over persons whom a statute or the laws of war
subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions.212 Congress has not passed a
statute defining the jurisdiction of military commissions.213  Military
commissions, therefore, only have jurisdiction over persons and offenses that the
law of war allows.214 President Bush must, by his own express assertion, comply
with the international law of war when establishing military commissions. 215
Despite President Bush's express assertion, the Bush Administration has
expressed a general unwillingness to comply with international treaties when
those treaties would limit the Administration's ability to fight the war on terrorism
in whatever form the Administration thought best.216 President Bush went so far
as to say in January 2002 that he would not apply the 1949 Geneva
212 The Quirin Court expressly stated that it did not define the limits of the jurisdiction of
military courts to try persons according to the law of war. Exparte Quinn, 317 U.S. 1, 45-46
(1942) ("We have no occasion now to define with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of
the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war.").
Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the defendants were charged with violations
clearly within the scope of "unlawful belligerents" under the law of war. Roosevelt's
proclamation limited access to federal courts for foreign citizens or residents:
Wiho during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States or any territory or
possession thereof, through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with
committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike
acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals; and that such persons shall not be privileged to seek any
remedy or maintain any proceeding directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or
proceeding sought on their behalf, in the courts of the United States... except under such
regulations as the Attorney General, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may from
time to time prescribe.
Proclamation No. 2561: Denying Certain Enemies Access to the Courts of the United States, 3
C.F.R. (1938-1943 Compilation) 309 (1968), reprinted in, 56 Stat. 1964 (1942). Roosevelt's
Proclamation was also reprinted under Article 82 of the Articles of War, which is entitled
"Spies." 10 U.S.C. § 1554 (1946) (repealed 1950).
The Court noted that under the Articles of War, military commissions had jurisdiction over
persons whom a statute or the laws of war subjected to military commissions. See Quirin, 317
U.S. at 25,36,48.
213 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
214 Id
215 Additionally, the U.S. Armed Forces specifically required in the Department of
Defense's Law of War Program that the Federal Government comply with international laws of
armed conflict. U.S. Dep't of Def., Department of Defense Directive Number 5100.77: DoD
Law of War Program (Dec. 9, 1998), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/
d5l0077_120998/d510077p.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2002); Committee on Military Affairs,
supra note 1, at 31.
216 See Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Behind-the-Scenes Clash Led Bush to
Reverse Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A12.
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Conventions-"the world's most revered" treaties--to the war in Afghanistan.217
After severe criticism from the international community and the State
Department,218 President Bush agreed to apply the sections of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions pertaining to prisoners.
The United States has ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions and is therefore
bound by its rules. President Bush still insists, however, that he will not apply the
Conventions to the Taliban or al Qaeda. 219 Even if a war on terrorism does not fit
neatly into the current international laws of war, President Bush does not have the
authority to amend international law unilaterally. Until the international
community revises the laws of war, the 1949 Geneva Conventions articulate the
law of war that President Bush must follow.220 Until then, President Bush must
comply with the scope both of permissible jurisdiction and of permissible
procedure that the 1949 Geneva Conventions articulated.221
217 Id
218 Id France and Britain warned the United States that they likely would not extradite
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters captured by their troops in Afghanistan unless President Bush
promised to honor the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Id Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff warned the President that ignoring the Geneva Conventions would put
American troops at risk if and when they were captured abroad. Id
219 Id
220 See Major Thomas J. Murphy, Sanctions and Enforcement of the Humanitarian Law
of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Geneva Protocol I of 1977, 103 MILL. REv. 3,
5,20 (1984).
The common Article I of each of the 1949 Geneva Conventions states, "Contracting
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all
circumstances." Id at 25. Common Article 2 states that "no state bound by the Conventions can
assert any valid reason for not respecting their terms." Id at 26. The Conventions explicitly
require that "[ulpon ratifying or acceding to the Conventions, individual states clearly assume
affirmative obligations to .... insure their detailed execution in the armed forces through their
commanders-in-chief .... Id at 41. As Major Murphy summarizes, "[in short, application of
the Conventions is not dependent upon any specific characterization of a conflict." Id
Consequently, Bush must comply with the Conventions even in this "new war" on terrorism,
"both at home and abroad." See id. at 25. But see Aldrich, supra note 116, at 765-66 (noting
that the Geneva Conventions are not enforced). Note, though, that Aldrich only discusses the
lack of enforcement of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in the context of states refusing to accept
protecting powers during or after an armed conflict. Id Additionally, Aldrich notes that the
1977 Protocols were created to ensure better compliance of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Id
at 766-67. See also Murphy, supra, at 65-67.
The Geneva Conventions do not cover all war crimes, though all war crimes are subject to
universal jurisdiction. Id at 43. The Conventions do articulate several war crimes that are also
"grave breaches." Id. at 61. The Conventions only mandate and provide jurisdiction over trial
for grave breaches. Id Consequently, states have the discretion to enforce the customary law of
war when persons breach war crimes that are not designated as grave breaches under the
Conventions but that still violate the Conventions. Id
221 Id. at 19-20; supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text. Nearly every state has
signed and ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including both the United States and
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1. Jurisdictional Limits of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
The 1949 Geneva Conventions state that the law of war applies to persons
involved in or affected by either a declared war or an armed conflict between
states.222 The United States has waged a "war on terrorism," but the laws of war
Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch, Legal Issues Arising from the War in Afghanistan and
Related Anti-Terrorism Efforts, at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/september 1/ihlqna.htm (last
visited Oct. 20, 2002); see also Murphy, supra note 220, at 4-5. The general terms of the 1949
Geneva Convention apply "to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them." Id at 20. Under the Geneva Conventions, "armed conflict ...
encompasses any difference arising between two states which leads to the intervention of armed
forces or their equivalent." kd at 21; see also Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at
11; supra note 140-41 and accompanying text. Since the 1949 Geneva Conventions are so
widely accepted, the provisions of the Conventions have become customary international law.
Murphy, supra note 220, at 21. Consequently, States are bound by the Conventions whether or
not they have ratified them. lId at 22.
Some critics assert that a war on terrorism does not qualify for coverage under the 1949
Geneva Conventions because the United States is not fighting any one "state." See supra notes
142-46 and accompanying text for the suggestion that all members of al Qaeda are sufficiently
connected to the armed conflict in Afghanistan to be subject to military commissions under the
1949 Geneva Conventions. Because the 1949 Geneva Conventions are customary international
law, this note takes the position that the provisions of the Conventions define "law of war," that
the UCMJ and Bush Administration state as defining the jurisdiction of military commissions.
See supra notes 138-41. Consequently, the rules of the 1949 Geneva Conventions regulate
military commissions even in the "new" and "amorphous" war against terrorism, which
according to the Bush Administration is not a war against any one state. See generally Murphy,
supra note 220, at 12-17 (chronicling the historical development of the customary intemational
law of war).
222 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 11 (discussing Common Article 2 of
the Geneva Conventions); Murphy, supra note 220, at 20, 22-26. Specifically, the First
Convention protects wounded or sick combatants, or members of the armed forces or persons
of hostile, organized resistance movements in an occupied territory, of any party to the conflict.
Murphy, supra note 220, at 23; Marmoa et al., supra note 6, at 47. The Second Convention
protects wounded or sick combatants aboard ships or aircraft and combatants who are
shipwrecked by or from ships or aircraft. Murphy, supra note 220, at 23. The Third Convention
protects prisoners of war or combatants who fall into the power of the enemy. Id. at 24. The
Fourth Convention protects civilians or noncombatants--persons who are not members of the
armed forces and do not participate in any military operations. ld.
Richard Dicker, Director of the International Justice Program, has noted that the U.N.
tribunals, which abide by the international law of war, were able to successfully prosecute
"some of the worst war criminals in the world," even under the high judicial standards of
international law. Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Military Commissions Can't Compare to
International Courts: Due Process Standards are Much Lower for Proposed U.S. Trials,
HUMAN RiGHTS NEws, at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/MilTribunal1204.htm (Dec, 4,
2001).
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only apply to those connected with the armed conflict.223
Officials of the Bush Administration have argued that the war against
terrorism is a "new kind of war" where the enemy is amorphous rather than any
particular state.224 Although the U.S. armed conflict is directed against
Afghanistan and al Qaeda, the latter of which was directly involved in the
September 11 attacks, the November 13 Order subjects persons to military
commissions who are not directly connected to the armed conflict in Afghanistan
or the terrorist attacks of September 11.225
2. Procedural Requirements of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
President Bush insists that "'we must not let foreign enemies use the forums
of liberty to destroy liberty itself. Foreign terrorists and agents must never again
be allowed to use our freedoms against us."' 226 What President Bush must
appreciate, however, is that even if the Constitution permits him to suspend
constitutional freedoms when trying suspected terrorists, he cannot suspend the
set of basic constitutional principles that transcend individual constitutional
texts.227 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide several minimum procedural
safeguards for trial and defense of those accused of breaching the laws of war.228
223 See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
224 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 12. According to the Administration,
therefore, the November 13 Order may apply to any alien connected with international
terrorism generally, even if that person has no relationship with Afghanistan. Id
225 November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 2, at 57,834; supra notes 144-46 and
accompanying text.
226 Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, WASH. POsT, Nov. 30,2001, at A28 (quoting President
George W. Bush, Address to Federal Prosecutors on Secret Military Trials (Nov. 29, 2001)).
President Bush's words were also grounded in action; two months previous to his address to
Federal Prosecutors, President Bush issued an Executive Order establishing the Office of
Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council to actively work to prevent future acts
of terror on U.S. soil. See Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 8, 2001).
227 JoHN E. FINN, CoNsTITuTIoNs IN CRsis: POLrICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF
LAw7, 15, 18, 19,26(1991).
228 Murphy, supra note 220, at 31. Trial must be "proper" as defined by Article 105 and
by the safeguards afforded Prisoners of War under the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. Id. at
28, 30; Marmoa et al., supra note 6, at 51. The only belligerents, otherwise known as
combatants, who are not guaranteed the right to prisoner of war status are saboteurs or unlawful
belligerents. Id. at 53. The Bush Administration has declared the terrorists connected to the
September 11 attacks to be unlawful combatants or belligerents. See Elisabeth Bumiller &
Steven Lee Myers, Senior Administration Officials Defend Military Tribunals for Terrorist
Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B6 (quoting Vice President Cheney's statement that
"somebody who comes into the United States of America illegally, who conducts a terrorist
operation killing thousands of innocent Americans-men, women and children-is not a lawful
combatant"). However, prosecuting countries are still not permitted to deny belligerents and
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The Conventions do not distinguish between citizens, aliens, civilians, or
military. 229 Rather, the Conventions state that every person-including civilian,
saboteurs their fundamental due process rights under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Marmoa et
al., supra note 6, at 54. The Conventions of 1949 apply to seven grave breaches of the laws of
war:.
(1) [WIillful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(2) [W]illfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(3) [EIxtensive destruction and appropriation of property, not just by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(4) [Clompelling a prisoner of war (Thind Convention) or a protected person (Fourth
Convention) to serve in the forces of the hostile power;
(5) [Wlillfully depriving a prisoner of war (Third Convention) or a protected person
(Fourth Convention) of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the
Convention;
(6) [U]nlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person;
and
(7) [Tlaking hostages.
Murphy, supra note 220, at 32 (emphasis added). The 1977 Protocol I, covering civilians,
articulated six additional grave breaches that the 1949 Conventions apply to:
(1) [M]aking the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack;
(2) [L]aunching an indiscriminative attack affecting the civilian population or civilian
objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects;
(3) [Llaunching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in
the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects;
(4) [M]aking non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of attack;
(5) [M]aking persons the object of attack in the knowledge that he is hors de combat, and
(6) [The perfidious use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red
lion and sun or of other protective signs recognized by the Conventions or Protocol I.
Id at 58-59. Additionally, superiors are liable for the breaches of their subordinates if superiors
should have known that subordinates would commit wrongful acts, yet superiors do nothing to
stop their subordinates. l at 61-62. Consequently, even though Osama bin Laden did not
himself physically attack the United States on September 11, he would be responsible for his
subordinates' actions under the Geneva Conventions.
Any terrorist associated with the September 11 attacks or with bin Laden's Afghanistan-
based al Qaeda terrorist organization who has committed one of the above acts is in violation of
the laws of war. Yet if the United States does not provide persons subject to the November 13
Order with minimum safeguards under the Conventions, the United States will also violate the
laws of war. Ida at 32 (noting that it is a violation of the laws of war to willfully deprive a
prisoner of war or a protected person the right of fair and regular trial as prescribed by the
Conventions).
229 Murphy, supra note 220, at 20-22. Major Murphy notes that the drafters of the 1949
Geneva Conventions were influenced by the theory of fundamental rights. Major Murphy
explains the theory thus:
[The] modem conception of the role of humanitarian law recognized that a state does not
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belligerent, and unlawful belligerent, whether citizen or alien-has certain
fundamental rights that can never be infringed. 230 Most importantly, the Geneva
Conventions require the prosecuting state to provide the defendants the same
procedural rights as that state provides its own military members.231 For example,
defendants have the same rights to appeal as members of the prosecuting state's
armed forces and to be informed of their rights.232 Additionally, accused persons
must serve their sentences under the same conditions as members of the
prosecuting state's armed forces.233 The Geneva Conventions also state that
defendants have the right to public trial, choice of counsel, and independent
judges.234 Additionally, the rules of the Geneva Conventions establish that there
must be a sunset provision for when the Conventions no longer apply to a
particular conflict.235 The United States must provide the fundamental freedoms
proclaim principles regarding the protections due to wounded, sick and shipwrecked
combatants, prisoners of war, and civilians in time of armed conflict solely in the hope of
protecting its own nationals and of promoting its own interests. Rather, it does so in
recognition of the basic respect that is due to the human person as such.
Id at 20.
230 Id at 10, 20; Marmoa et al., supra note 6, at 45-46. The fundamental rights of proper
trial and defense must meet the minimum safeguards provided for by Article 105 of the General
Conventions and the requirements for treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
Murphy, supra note 220, at 28 (citing Geneva Conventions of 1949, specifically common
articles 49, 50, 129, 146). The 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention establishes fundamental
rights for persons interned as enemy civilians. Id
The general rule under the Conventions is that a state is not to create special tribunals to
prosecute persons of enemy nationality who are accused of committing even grave breaches of
the convention. Id at 29. Violators of the Conventions must be prosecuted in national criminal
court systems, those either of the capturing party or of the captured. Id The requirement that
parties prosecute violators in national courts does not, however, seem to eliminate the validity
of military commissions under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. First, the Conventions state that
the purpose behind requiring trial in national courts is to ensure that trials of violators are
uniform. Id at 29. The Geneva Conventions seem to discuss "national courts" as distinct from
"international courts," rather than national as distinct from military. See id at 31-32. Military
commissions, such as the commissions provided for in the November 13 Order, can be national
courts. Also, if persons subject to military commissions are given the same essential rights as
persons subject to federal courts, uniformity is achieved. More importantly, military
commissions are recognized means under international law of trying violations of the laws of
war. Marmoa et al., supra note 6, at 8-12; see also id at 49 (discussing the effect of the 1949
Geneva Conventions on the jurisdiction of military commissions).
231 Murphy, supra note 220, at 30-31.
232 Id. at 31 (citing Article 106 of the Third Geneva Convention).
233 Id. (citing Article 108 of the Third Geneva Convention).
234 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 31.
235 Murphy, supra note 220, at 53-54. The Conventions do not apply "on the general
close of military operations." Id It is often difficult to determine when military operations end,
especially when an armed conflict involves several or a large number of states and military
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articulated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to any defendant, whether in a civil
court or a military commission.236
On its face, President Bush's military commissions do not safeguard the
fundamental freedoms required in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Aliens subject
to the November 13 Order, as written, are not afforded all the judicial safeguards
that the government affords to United States military personnel. 237 The Secretary
of Defense's March Regulations do comply with many, but not all, of the courts-
martial requirements. 238 This note argues, however, that the November 13 Order
itself, without the gloss of regulations that may be changed by subsequent
Administrations, must comply with the courts-martial requirements to satisfy the
1949 Geneva Conventions requirement of equal treatment with U.S. military
personal. 239
B. Following International Law is Good Policy
The Bush Administration has recognized that a world coalition is necessary
to win the war on terrorism.240 It is good policy, therefore, to fight the war on
terrorism in a way that encourages international cooperation. 241 Evidence has
already emerged showing that countries will not extradite terrorists to the United
operations close at different times for each. ld.
236 Military Commissions, supra note 6, at 76.
237 Id. at 77. The November 13 Order as written does not provide the essential due
process rights required under the courts-martial procedure of the UCMJ. See supra Part IV.B.
Some experts on military commissions have argued that if military commissions must comply
with courts-martial law, the United States should simply try violators of the laws of war in
courts-martial, thereby ensuring dignity of the tribunal. Military Commissions, supra note 6, at
80.
238 See supra notes 159, 182 and accompanying text.
239 Infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
240 President George W. Bush & General Tommy Franks, Remarks in Press Availability
with the Press Travel Pool, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011228-
l.html (Dec. 28, 2001).
Attorney General Ashcroft has specifically stated:
[This is a fight, not only in Afghanistan and not only in the United States... [;] it's a fight
internationally. And we're pleased with the Spanish cooperation and the German
cooperation, the English cooperation. Cooperating nations all around the world. We would
hope that these linkages... might be able to provide us with additional information that
will be valuable to us in continuing effort against terrorism internationally.
Interview by Tom Brokaw with John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, NBC
Nightly News (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 19, 2001).
241 See Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 32; see also Statement of Senator
Patrick Leahy, supra note 161 (warning that even if the November 13 Order is constitutional,
"[ultimately, the question is not only whether our government has the right or the power to take
certain actions in certain ways, but whether the means we choose truly protect our security").
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States unless the Bush Administration guarantees that the extradited person will
not be subject to the death penalty or military commissions. 242 Commentators
have proclaimed that the United States became the victim of terrorist attacks on
September 11 because of mistakes the country had made in its international
policies.243 Rather than heal the wounds caused by such mistakes, President
Bush's November 13 Order may further alienate the countries of the world in at
least three ways.
First, the November 13 Order declares that the commissions have
extrajudicial jurisdiction244 in that the Order prevents the courts of any other
nation or any international courts from exercising jurisdiction over persons
subject to military commissions. 245 The world community vigorously opposes the
United States courts' tendency to exercise extra-judicial jurisdiction.246 By
asserting extra-judicial jurisdiction, the November 13 Order will likely aggravate,
242 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 32, 39. Spain, which is holding
important members of al Qaeda involved in the September 11 attacks, has stated that it will not
extradite anyone to the United States without assurance that the United States will try persons it
extradites in regular courts and without the death penalty. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Spain to
Study U.S. Requests to Extradite Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at B4; Sam
Dillon & Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Spain Sets Hurdle for Extraditions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,
2001, at Al.
243 See, e.g., Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, Terrorism, International Law, & Islam, Lecture at The
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law (Nov. 13, 2001). Dr. Yazdi, General Secretary of
the Freedom Movement of Iran and former Foreign Minister of Iran during the time of the U.S.
embassy hostage crisis in Iran, noted that bin Laden and al Qaeda hate the United States
because the United States helped bring to power oppressive governments in the Middle East in
an attempt to destroy communism. Bin Laden has specifically listed three events as the
foundations of his hatred: the United States' storming of the Arabian Peninsula during World
War II; the United States' role in the establishment of a brutal government in Iran; and the
United States' support of Israel's occupation of Palestinian land. Id
244 At the same time, the Order weakens the validity of civil trials in the eyes of the
world. Article 18 of the UCMJ provides that "general courts-martial also have jurisdiction to try
any person who by the law is subject to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any
punishment permitted by the law of war." 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2000). If the United States does not
put trust in its civil system, why should foreign citizens and states?
245 See November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 7(b)(1), at 57,835.
246 See Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of
Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 141, 176 (2001) (noting that some states consider transient and general doing-
business forms of U.S. jurisdiction "exorbitant"). But see id at 195-97 (noting that
extraterritorial jurisdiction is common in the criminal, as opposed to civil context). The U.S.
government does not have the power to control foreign states' courts unless the United States
and the foreign state have agreed to such jurisdiction in a treaty. No such treaty that governs
jurisdiction yet exists, and discussions at conventions on the proposed Hague Convention on the
Settlement of Disputes indicate that no treaty is likely to exist given that the majority of the
world's states oppose extra-judicial jurisdiction. Id
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not ameliorate, foreign states.
Second, because the November 13 Order only applies to non-citizens,2 47 the
Bush Administration declares that U.S. citizens deserve rights but that citizens of
other states do not.248 The November 13 Order therefore sends the message to the
world that the United States sees citizens of foreign states as second class.249 At
the same time, the Administration sends the message that other countries are
legally permitted to subject U.S. citizens to secret military trials like those
provided for under the November 13 Order.250
Finally, the November 13 Order sends the message to the world that the
United States is a hypocrite.251 The United States has strongly criticized foreign
247 November 13 Order, supra note 4, § 2(a), at 57,834. The "non-citizen only" provision
of the November 13 Order may, in the future, encompass even more persons than it does today.
Federal and state legislatures have discussed denying citizenship to illegal immigrants' children
born in the United States. See generally Robert J. Shulman, Comment, Children of a Lesser
God: Should the Fourteenth Amendment be Altered or Repealed to Deny Automatic Citizenship
Rights and Privileges to American Born Children of Illegal Aliens?, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 669
(1995).
There is evidence, however, that the Bush Administration will subject citizens to the
military commissions promulgated under the November 13 Order. See Richard Willing, Fight
to Clear Mudd's Name May Affect Terror War, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 2002, at 4A (noting that
the federal government argues that it may subject the two U.S. citizens with alleged Taliban or
al Qaeda connections it is holding as enemy combatants, Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi,
to military commissions under the precedent of Ex parte Quirin); see also News Release, Cato
Institute, Military Tribunal for Al Mujahir Problematic, Scholar Says, at http://www.cato.org/
new/06-02106-10-02r.html (June 10, 2002) (noting that the U.S. government announced that it
would treat Abdullah Al Mujahir, a U.S. citizen, as an enemy combatant for plotting to build
and detonate a radiological bomb). The Bush Administration cites Ex parte Quirin as precedent
for subjecting U.S. citizens to military commissions. d Importantly, however, President
Roosevelt's commission was, unlike President Bush's November 13 Order, limited to enemy
combatants, not to non-citizens. See supra notes 51, 55, 56 and accompanying text.
248 The United States is unwise to call for international help at the same time it declares
international citizens inferior. See Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 35; see also
supra note 158 (discussing that the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that all persons,
citizen or alien, civilian or military, deserve equal protection under the Constitution and the law
of war).
249 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 35.
250 Human Rights Watch, Fact Sheet: Past U.S. Criticism of Military Tribunals, HUMAN
RIGHTS NEWS, at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/1 l/tribunals1128.htm (Nov. 28, 2001) (noting
that "the text of the Order may become a model for governments seeking a legal cloak for
political repression"); cf 147 CONG. REc. S9859 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Dodd in the context of a discussion about the International Criminal Court that the United
States alienates the international community and that it must act with the international
community in mind if it wishes to gain international cooperation in trying terrorists).
251 Human Rights Watch, supra note 250. See Committee on Military Affairs, supra note
1, at 32. The Human Rights Watch has noted:
The United States has repeatedly argued that people accused of war crimes deserve
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states for not affording U.S. citizens abroad minimal judicial rights. 252 The United
States has explicitly condemned military commissions similar to those that the
November 13 Order provides for when U.S. citizens were the defendants. 253
Additionally, the United States has stated that it will not ratify the Rome Treaty,
which establishes the International Criminal Court,254 because the treaty does not
meet U.S. constitutional due process requirements. 255
When interpreting whether the November 13 Order complies with
international law, the President, Congress, and the Court should evaluate the
Order as written, rather than the Order as limited by regulation.256 Even if the
full due process protection, including alleged war criminals in Bosnia and Rwanda. "How
can the United States credibly make that argument when others are victims if it refuses to
act that way itself when Americans are the victims?"
Human Rights Watch, U.S.: New Military Commissions Threatens Rights, Credibility, HUMAN
RIGHTS NEws, at http:/lwww.hrw.orglpress/2001/11/Miltribsi1 5.htm (Nov. 15, 2001)
(quoting Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch).
252 Human Rights Watch, supra note 250. Recent examples of the United States'
criticism include a Russian "secret trial for espionage," a Nigerian special military court order
of execution, and a Peruvian "hooded military court" conviction of terrorism. Id.
253 Id. (discussing the United States' recent criticism of eleven countries for using military
tribunals that did not afford due process protections to try civilians). Examples of due process
protections that the United States sees as essential, even in trials involving national security,
include the right to a public trial; the right to an impartial trial (the United States stated that
foreign authorities were not impartial); the right to a presumption of innocence; and the right to
appeal. Id (referring to critiques of Burma, China, and Sudan).
254 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9* (1998), http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
255 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REc. S9854 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2001) (statement of Sen. Helms)
(noting that the United States does not support the ICC because it threatens to deny Americans
abroad due process, particularly military service members). But see 147 CONG. REc. S9859
(daily ed. Sept. 26, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (noting that during the war on terrorism the
United States must support the International Criminal Court more than ever or risk endangering
its military service members abroad).
Some scholars have pointed out that an international criminal court would be the ideal
place to try terrorists such as bin Laden, especially when such terrorists are in the custody of
countries that refuse to extradite defendants to the United States due to objections of capital
punishment or military commissions. Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 39. The
International Criminal Court (ICC) would not have jurisdiction over persons for the September
11 attacks, however, because the court only has jurisdiction over crimes committed after the
Court comes into force. See Marlise Simons, Without Fanfare or Cases, International Court
Sets Up, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1, 2002, at A3 ('l'he court's Jurisdication will only apply to possible
crimes committed on or after Monday, July 1, 2002."). The United States has vehemently
opposed the establishment of the ICC; nevertheless, the ICC has obtained the required 60
ratifications necessary to come into force on July 1, 2002. See the United Nation's International
Criminal Court Internet site at http:llwww.un.org/law/icclindex.html (last visited Oct. 22,
2002).
256 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 6.
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current Administration intends to limit the scope of the November 13 Order, a
future Administration could revise any limiting regulations that the Bush
Administration creates.257 Additionally, if the Supreme Court upholds the
November 13 Order as written, or if Congress does not enact legislation to limit
the scope of the Order, a future President could use the November 13 Order as
precedent for acting within the full scope of the Order as written.258 This note
therefore recommends either that the President amend his November 13 Order or
that Congress pass a law requiring that military commissions comply with
international law.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the United States government and its people react to terrorism, the country
must keep in mind the long-term goals of peace and prosperity.259 The United
States owes it to the individuals who died in the September 11 attacks, as well as
to the soldiers who have lost their lives fighting in Afghanistan since September
11, to do everything within its power to win the war on terrorism. A war
commission that violates international law will hinder the United States in its
global war on terrorism. If the United States violates international law, it will
alienate foreign states and lose the protections of those international laws.
Trying terrorists under a military commission is not inherently problematic as
long as it meets international law requirements. 260 To meet the international and
constitutional law requirements, President Bush must amend the November 13
Order to limit, or Congress must enact legislation that limits, the jurisdiction of
the military commissions to persons connected with the September 11 attacks, al
Qaeda, or Afghanistan. Additionally, the President must amend the November 13
Order to comply, or Congress must require that the procedure of military
commissions comply, with the minimal courts-martial procedure required under
the UCMJ.
Support of the international community is necessary for success in the war on
terrorism, and the international community will not support the United States so
257 Id ("Indeed, if the powers asserted by the President in the Order were upheld, this
President or a future President could use the Order as precedent to exercise those powers in a
different context and without the gloss now presented by his representatives.")
258 Committee on Military Affairs, supra note 1, at 6.
259 Yazdi, supra note 243.
260 If the President will not amend the November 13 Order, which does seem likely due
to his constant statements in defense of the Order as written, then Congress should expressly
limit the Order. There are currently bills in Congress, one in the House and one in the Senate,
that propose limitations on military commissions that purport to meet international law
requirements. See H.R. 3468, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1937, 107th Cong. (2002); 148 CONG.
REC. S733 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statements on S. 1937, a bill to set forth requirements for
trials and sentencing by military commissions).
1282 [Vol. 63:1225
TRIALS IN TIMES OF WAR
long as the November 13 Order, which violates international law, is left
unchanged. 261 President Bush has said "[t]he world will see that when we put a
coalition together that says, 'join us,' I mean it ... [a]nd in order to lead the
coalition, we must show that we will complete the mission." 262 If President Bush
really "means it," he will take seriously the requirements of international law and
the concerns the rest of the world has with his military commissions.
261 The United States must comply in general with international law to guarantee the
support of the international community, and the laws of war are not the only international law
that the United States must follow. See Sanger, supra note 191 (noting that foreign states have
criticized the United States for violating international law by not notifying foreign states when
their citizens are detained).
262 President George W. Bush & General Tommy Franks, supra note 240.
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